Another Look at Divine Omnipotence & the so-called Fall
There ARE things God cannot do
Rather than some ontological rupture located in the past, the "fall" may refer to the "ascent" of a teleological striving oriented to the future.
In this creatio ex Deo, the Divine Breath continuously exhales Christ's logoi into an uncreated, coeternal, formless void, gifting potencies ex nihilo.
The Cosmic Christ (including co-creators) thus vanquishes that im-potent (not Manichean) prevenient chaos, although not without - not only essential & kenotic, but - certain metaphysical constraints, which cause us, still, to groaneth & travaileth in labor pain together.
A Divine Simplicity would still hold & an analogy of being, too, e.g. regarding the Many.
The One would refer to co-creative & synergetic activities.
Divine omnipotence would require more nuancing than as commonly understood. There ARE things God cannot do, just not anything that would finally matter, i.e defeat His perfect will.
This account, which is influenced by Jack Haught's early work, wherein God's omnipotence is restrained (& constrained?), has also been influenced by Berdyaev & Weil.
Weil relates the Fall & Creation - not temporally, but - causally, in terms of God's abdication of power.
Weil's leit motif invoked a dualism of the divine & created, which can be resolved per
a) false syntheses = idolatry &
b) proper synthesis = mediation. She applies it to religion, philosophy & politics. The mediator between the spiritual & material? Christ.
Her "mediation" has been described in places as an emanationist account, where God's only diminished by creation if one thinks of him as Being, whereas, if God is thought of as Good, then creation will be the product of pure, gratiuitous love, wherein Beauty will make us desire the Good (like Bonaventure?).
I'd qualify that, above, as "God's only diminished by creation if one thinks of him *only in terms of * Being, participatorily, when He's also gratuitous love, perichoretically."
Mirroring this theology of Being & the Good, Weil's anthropology was - not "I think, therefore I am," but - "I can [act], therefore I am."
This certainly brings to mind Plotinus & Maximus for me and also others of an existentialist - personalist bent, e.g. Berdyaev.
Weil seems to abide seeming contradictions, e.g. problem of evil, without completely resolving them systematically, although she stipulates both God's absolute innocence & that evil doesn't inhere in matter. I do gather that she does advocate an existential resolution, in part, by following Beauty & Love, whereby our voids will be filled by Grace. Nothing will ultimately be unredeemable.