Chalce-DONE Part 2
the meaning of Exemplification
What might it mean to say that persons "exemplify" natures? beyond distinguishing
exemplifications from instantiations?
We could misinterpret the
significance of exemplarity, if we take it out of its historical contexts.
As one moves from Plato to Augustine, Aristotle, Aquinas & the Greek Fathers, changes in the meaning of "exemplarity" go beyond mere nuance.
Bonaventure, however, following the Damascene, Dionysius & the Capps, devises a conception consistent w/the best of all the above.
"[W]ith regard to the Trinity, Bonaventure opted for the Greek Cappadocian
model." ~ Ilia Delio
The link, below, will download Delio's article:
http://cdn.theologicalstudies.net/60/60.2/60.2.2.pdf
"It's in this context that I lean toward Scotus' use of exemplification, which bridges East & West." ~ Peter C. Phan in The Cambridge Companion to the Trinity, 2011
In my view, Scotus' conception of divine persons as exemplifications works well w/theophany paradigms (eg Eriugena, Bonaventure, Bulgakov). Applying that same grammar, eschatologically, w/all logoi realized, humanity's essence will be a primary substance & immanent universal. Human persons, then, become exemplifications of Logos.
Scotus was pretty close to threading the modalism & tritheism needle w/this conceptual maneuver. So, it seemed to me to be a great fit to apply to the Maximian creation as Incarnation interpretation (Jordan Daniel Wood), you know, to head off both modalism & polytheism.
Exemplarity changes what we mean by - not only person, but - individual. Hypostases (real, distinct persons) are – not
"individualizations," but - "mutually constituted" particulars.
As a practical upshot of adopting Scotus' haecceity & Peirce's bruteness, any given person remains a fathomless mystery, not to be defined. We can, however, still successfully refer to persons in terms of particular exemplifications and so give each a name.
This grammar does not devolve into nominalism as it affirms successful referentiality even while denying definability. It's only saying, rather, that any reference to one person will necessarily refer to all persons.
So, being neither academic philosopher nor academic theologian, so, uncertain how, for example, Hegel Dads conceive & defend creation as Incarnation, I’m just here to say that, as a Peircean PawPaw & Scotistic Schoolboy, their approach seems to work in the idioms that I employ in my own panSEMIOentheism, which aspires to be consistent with Neo-Chalcedonian, Cosmotheandric, Franciscan and other such minority reports.