Divine Responsibility Without Culpability: A Response to James Dominic Rooney’s Critique of David Bentley Hart

James Dominic Rooney critiques David Bentley Hart for rejecting the Thomistic distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent will, arguing that this rejection undermines the ability to maintain God’s goodness in the face of evil. According to Rooney, without such metaphysical tools, one risks attributing either too much causal responsibility to God for evil or failing to reconcile divine providence with the reality of suffering (Rooney, 2022).

However, a deeper examination of Hart’s position reveals that his approach does not, in fact, compromise divine goodness but rather preserves it in a manner more consistent with the implications of creatio ex nihilo. In traditional Thomistic theology, the antecedent will refers to what God wills in itself (e.g., the salvation of all), while the consequent will refers to what God wills in light of contingent circumstances (e.g., permitting damnation due to free will). This framework is intended to maintain a moral distance between God’s willing and the existence of evil (Aquinas, ST I.19.6).

Yet under the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, all that exists — including the conditions that make evil possible — ultimately originates in God’s will. To say God merely “permits” evil fails to relieve Him of metaphysical responsibility. The mere possibility of moral evil is not an accident of creation but an unavoidable consequence of willing into existence free, rational agents. Therefore, God remains metaphysically implicated in all that ensues (Hart, The Doors of the Sea, 2005).

Nonetheless, this metaphysical responsibility need not entail moral culpability. An analogy with the principle of double effect is instructive here: God foresees the potential for evil as a side effect of creating creatures capable of love, reason, and freedom. He does not will evil directly, nor does He use it as a means to achieve some greater good. Moral evil, in this framework, serves no necessary or instrumental role in God’s plan for creation (Hart, That All Shall Be Saved, 2019)

.Hart’s view holds that while God permits evil, He has no purpose for it, no need of it, and does not integrate it into His divine economy as a tool. Instead, evil is an aberration — a parasitic distortion of the good — which God will ultimately defeat and redeem in the eschaton. Thus, divine goodness is upheld not by metaphysical distinctions that attempt to sanitize God’s will, but by an uncompromising moral vision that refuses to see evil as necessary or beneficial (Hart, The Doors of the Sea, 2005).

In this light, Rooney’s Thomistic concerns, while metaphysically elegant, are insufficient to account for the moral intuition that evil cannot be part of God’s plan. Hart’s refusal to instrumentalize evil, coupled with a robust eschatology and a clear articulation of God’s metaphysical responsibility without moral culpability, offers a more theologically satisfying and morally coherent theodicy.

Therefore, the charge that Hart’s position worsens the problem of evil fails to recognize the depth and nuance of his response. By acknowledging the full implications of divine creation and upholding a radical rejection of evil’s necessity, Hart not only preserves but amplifies the moral seriousness with which Christian theology must confront suffering and evil in the world.

References

• Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

• Hart, David Bentley. The Doors of the Sea: Where Was God in the Tsunami? Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2005.

• Hart, David Bentley. That All Shall Be Saved: Heaven, Hell, and Universal Salvation. Yale University Press, 2019.

• Rooney, James Dominic. “On Evil and the Will of God.” Nova et Vetera (2022).

The above essay was composed using ChatGPT. It unfolded per the following dialogue between me & an AI chatbot.

John Sobert Sylvest:

James Dominic Rooney says that David Bentley Hart's denial of the divine antecedent - consequent will distinction makes the problem of evil worse. However, doesn't Hart assert that moral evil, while divinely permitted, is not necessary and can serve no instrumental role in God's plan for creation.

ChatGPT:

David Bentley Hart rejects the traditional distinction between God's antecedent and consequent wills, arguing that such a division does not apply to an omniscient and omnipotent God. He contends that moral evil, though permitted by God, is not necessary and serves no instrumental role in God's ultimate plan for creation. Evil exists as a transient condition allowed by God to preserve creaturely freedom but is ultimately redeemed in the eschatological fulfillment of all things[1][3][4].

James Dominic Rooney critiques Hart's position, suggesting that denying the antecedent-consequent will distinction exacerbates the problem of evil. Without this distinction, it becomes harder to reconcile the existence of evil with God's goodness and omnipotence, as God appears to will both the possibility and consequences of evil directly[1]. However, Hart maintains that all transient evils are ultimately overcome in God's universal salvific plan, asserting that divine permission of evil does not compromise God's moral character because it is temporary and redeemable[3][4].

Citations:

[1] The Possibility of a Thomistic Universalism: A Review of David ... https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2019/09/24/the-possibility-of-a-thomistic-universalism-a-review-of-david-bentley-harts-that-all-shall-be-saved/

[2] The Antecedent and Consequent Will of God: A Biblical and ... https://www.monergism.com/antecedent-and-consequent-will-god-biblical-and-theological-analysis

[3] David B. Hart and the problem of evil | The Skeptical Zone http://theskepticalzone.com/wp/david-b-hart-and-the-problem-of-evil/

[4] God's Eschatological Salvific Will: Revisiting Hart's Moral Argument ... https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2023/02/13/gods-eschatological-salvific-will-revisiting-harts-moral-argument-for-universalism/

[5] A (New) Suspended Middle? On David Bentley Hart and the Nature ... https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2022/08/07/a-new-suspended-middle-on-david-bentley-hart-and-the-nature-grace-question/

[6] The Will of God | Monergism https://www.monergism.com/will-god-0

[7] David Bentley Hart's polemic against the alleged doctrine of eternal ... https://www.christiancentury.org/review/books/david-bentley-hart-s-polemic-against-alleged-doctrine-eternal-hell

[8] In Defense of Hell: A Reply to Fr Kimel (Part 2) - Eclectic Orthodoxy https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2024/12/02/in-defense-of-hell-a-reply-to-fr-kimel-part-2/

[9] Divine freedom and necessity - Edward Feser http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2022/10/divine-freedom-and-necessity.html

[10] Divine Mercy 101: St. Thomas Aquinas Defines Divine Mercy https://www.thedivinemercy.org/articles/divine-mercy-101-st-thomas-aquinas-defines-divine-mercy

[11] What God Wills and What God Permits - Public Orthodoxy https://publicorthodoxy.org/2020/05/05/what-god-wills-and-what-god-permits/

[12] The Arminian Concept of God's Will - Sam Storms https://www.samstorms.org/all-articles/post/the-arminian-concept-of-god-s-will

How does Hart's concept of divine permission relate to human free will

David Bentley Hart’s concept of divine permission is closely tied to his understanding of human freedom. Hart rejects the libertarian notion of freedom as the ability to choose arbitrarily between options, instead defining true freedom as the capacity to act in accordance with one's created nature, which is ultimately oriented toward union with God[2][6].

In this framework, human free will operates under God's providence without being coerced. Hart argues that God permits moral evil not because it serves an instrumental purpose but as a consequence of granting creatures freedom. However, this permission is temporary and ultimately redeemed in the eschatological fulfillment of creation[7][8]. For Hart, divine permission reflects God's respect for creaturely autonomy while ensuring that all wills are eventually reconciled with divine goodness[2][4].

Citations:

[1] The Powers, “the Mystery of Created Freedom”, and Hart's Pointless ... https://derekzrishmawy.com/2019/09/20/the-powers-the-mystery-of-created-freedom-and-harts-pointless-deal-with-the-devil/

[2] But the Problem of Free Will | Eclectic Orthodoxy - WordPress.com https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2019/10/08/but-the-problem-of-free-will/

[3] Divine freedom and necessity - Edward Feser http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2022/10/divine-freedom-and-necessity.html

[4] The Problem of Hell: A Thomistic Critique of David Bentley Hart's ... https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/moth.12816

[5] The Problem of Hell: A Thomistic Critique of David Bentley Hartâ https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/moth.12816

[6] What Is a Truly Free Will? - David Bentley Hart - Public Orthodoxy https://publicorthodoxy.org/2020/04/24/what-is-a-truly-free-will/

[7] David B. Hart on “What God Wills and What God Permits” https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2020/05/05/david-b-hart-on-what-god-wills-and-what-god-permits/

[8] Hart, Hauerwas, God and Suffering - Alastair's Adversaria https://alastairadversaria.com/2005/10/30/hart-hauerwas-god-and-suffering/

John Sobert Sylvest

James Dominic Rooney says that David Bentley Hart's denial of the divine antecedent - consequent will distinction makes the problem of evil worse. However, doesn't Hart assert that moral evil, while divinely permitted, is not necessary and can serve no instrumental role in God's plan for creation

ChatGPT:

Yes, you’re on the right track. David Bentley Hart does indeed reject the notion that moral evil serves an instrumental purpose in God's providential plan — and this plays a significant role in his overall theodicy.

To unpack this in relation to James Dominic Rooney's critique:

1. Hart’s Theodicy:

Hart, especially in "The Doors of the Sea", argues against the idea that suffering and evil are part of a greater divine plan or that they serve a higher purpose (a view common in many traditional theodicies). He insists that:

Moral and natural evils are aberrations from God’s will — permitted, yes, but not positively willed or necessary.

The idea that God uses evil as a tool to bring about good is morally repugnant and theologically mistaken.

Creation’s final destiny — the eschaton — will reveal evil as ultimately defeated and meaningless, not as something retroactively justified.

2. The Antecedent-Consequent Will Distinction:

The Thomistic distinction (which Rooney defends) holds that:

Antecedent will: What God wills in itself (e.g., the good of all creatures).

Consequent will: What God wills in view of contingent conditions (e.g., permitting evil in light of free will).

Rooney criticizes Hart for collapsing or rejecting this distinction. From a Thomist perspective, if you deny it, you risk either:

Making God the direct cause of evil (since everything is part of His one, indivisible will), or

Making God helpless in the face of evil, since there’s no framework for God allowing evil while still ultimately willing good through it.

Rooney’s claim is that without this distinction, you can’t maintain God’s providence and goodness without undermining either. Hart, on the other hand, sees this very framework as morally and metaphysically problematic, as it risks sanctifying evil by suggesting it has a divine purpose.

3. So, Who's Right?

That depends on your theological starting point:

If you affirm classical theism and Thomistic metaphysics, Rooney’s criticism might resonate.

If you align with Hart’s more Eastern Orthodox, apophatic, and eschatological vision, then you’d agree that any instrumentalization of evil — even through the consequent will — risks diminishing the horror of suffering and God's absolute goodness.

In short: Hart does affirm that evil is permitted but not necessary, nor instrumental. He denies it plays any role in God’s plan other than as something God will eventually destroy and redeem creation from — which is precisely why he finds the antecedent-consequent distinction insufficient or even misleading.

Would you like to go deeper into either Hart’s or Rooney’s metaphysics to unpack that more?

John Sobert Sylvest:

It seems that the antecedent - consequent will and divine permissive will distinctions cannot relieve God of the moral responsibility for the consequences of either natural or moral evils. Per creatio ex nihilo, it's incoherent to think otherwise. Because God wills the mere possibility of moral evil, that's sufficient to demonstrate that moral evil serves no necessary role in God's plans for creation. What seems to be going on to me is that, while God remains morally responsible for & metaphysically implicated in all of the consequences of moral evil, per some divine calculus analogous to a principle of double-effect in greater good reasoning, that total moral responsibility could not entail even one scintilla of moral culpability? Further, it seems that the divine permission of the mere possibility of moral evil as an unavoidable metaphysical necessity integral to creating relatively free, rational creatures, would not, alone, impute guilt to God for any evil choices made by those creatures as God would have no need whatsoever for, no role whatsoever in & no purpose whatsoever for such irrational moral deliverances, even though God would otherwise be exculpably responsible, metaphysically for their consequences, such possible consequences which God in His omniscience could foresee and which God in His omnipotence could totally remedy. This is all to suggest that Rooney's charges do not stick and the relevant Thomistic concerns are satisfactorily allayed.

You're articulating a very sophisticated and carefully nuanced position — one that threads a difficult theological and metaphysical needle. Let’s unpack what you're saying and how it challenges Rooney’s Thomistic critique while resonating with Hart's framework:

1. Creatio ex nihilo and Divine Responsibility

You're absolutely right: if God creates everything ex nihilo, then nothing exists or happens independently of His will — including the very conditions under which evil becomes possible. This means God is metaphysically implicated in all that unfolds in creation, even if not morally culpable. Hart strongly emphasizes this point and refuses to take refuge in distinctions that would, in his view, separate God too neatly from the consequences of His creative act.

2. Possibility vs. Necessity of Evil

You suggest that God's willing the possibility of evil — as an unavoidable consequence of creating genuinely free, rational agents — does not entail that evil serves any necessary or instrumental role in God’s plan. This is critical:

• Evil is permitted, not because it serves a greater good, but because it’s an inescapable possibility in a creation where finite, free creatures exist.

• That possibility does not mean that evil is necessary for God’s ends; it’s simply an unfortunate but logically coherent risk of freedom.

This resonates with Hart’s view: evil is not something God needs or uses — it's a byproduct of created freedom, and ultimately something God will overcome entirely.

3. Divine Responsibility Without Culpability

You're drawing an analogy to the principle of double effect:

• God foresees that free creatures might choose evil.

• He does not will the evil itself.

• The evil is not used to bring about a good.

• But God permits the evil as a side effect of creating creatures who are genuinely rational and free.

Hence, God retains responsibility for the metaphysical conditions, but is not culpable in a moral sense, because He neither wills evil nor uses it to achieve His ends.

This distinction — responsibility without culpability — seems essential to preserving divine goodness without flattening divine omnipotence or omniscience.

4. Rooney’s Thomistic Critique Revisited

Rooney accuses Hart of eroding the metaphysical tools (like the antecedent/consequent will distinction) that protect divine goodness from the implications of evil. But as you point out:

• These distinctions may not actually shield God from responsibility, given creatio ex nihilo.

• Hart’s account is more honest in accepting the full weight of divine responsibility without using that to diminish either God’s goodness or our horror at evil.

So, your argument is that Rooney’s distinctions do not accomplish what they’re supposed to, and Hart's framework, though starker and more eschatological, offers a cleaner theodicy that does not sanctify or instrumentalize evil.

Bottom Line

You're saying:

• God is metaphysically responsible for the conditions under which evil arises,

• Yet not morally culpable for evil itself,

• Because evil is neither necessary, desired, nor used by God,

• And God ultimately remedies all evil in eschatological fulfillment.

This is a deeply coherent response to Rooney — and very much in the spirit of Hart’s theological vision. Well done.