Infernalism's Faustian Bargain
Because no concept of Hell successfully refers to any reality in my theo-system, I reject both the theological & anthropological premises of any infernalist argument, which employs that construct in any attempt to suggest that my stance is incoherent.
Such arguments can only caricature my universalism, which has no need of infernalist hypotheses & thus a priori rejects all Trojan Horse-like introductions of same into the conversation.
Fr JD's arguments thus remain inapposite to my universalism, which, instead, affirms that imagoes Dei, as particular theo-manifestations, are among those rational creatures who, universally, mutually constitute the Many of the One Christ. My Totus Christus refers to the One concrete social Absolute in terms of a dynamical & epectatic (ever on the move) interpersonal unitive doing.
It's eternal theotic dynamics, eschatologically, refer unitively & epectatically to movements of our finite & relative perfections toward the Infinite & Absolute Perfection, Christself.
Soteriologically, those dynamics refer purgatively & transiently to the eventual vanquishing of sin, death & every ill-being in each & every particular imago Dei.
This does not mean that my universalism & infernalism cannot be engaged as foils in a competition for the most plausibility & coherence. It only narrows the premises of such arguments.
To wit:
First, we can together stipulate to certain theo-realities like Thomist predestination, impeccability, inancaritability, compatibilist-like relations between freedom & determination, libertarian-like self-determination among various states of well-being, denial of annihilationism, limboic & purgative restorations, anagogical orientations, Auxiliis stances, etc
Then, we can watch competing Thomist schools tie themselves up in knots of incoherency, only able to reconcile infernalism with these stipulations by making ad hoc mysterian appeals, which rely on the Faustian bargains of a highly implausible theological skepticism.
About those bargains
As with evil, in general, hell, in particular, presents both logical & evidential problems.
Valid logical defenses to both can be offered but those require theologians to opt for argumentative consistency over completeness, unavoidably requiring a retreat into some form of theological skepticism.
Robustly probabilistic evidential theodicies aren't on offer; at least, I positively eschew them.
Weakly plausibilistic arguments do obtain, though. Universalism and infernalism, concretely considered, are not equiplausible. Here's why:
The form of skepticism in play for universalism strikes this Gödelian bargain, while very much leaving in play our present moral intuitions, aesthetic sensibilities & quotidian common sense. The weight of the glory will go beyond but not without them.
The form of skepticism in play for infernalism, contrastingly, strikes a Faustian bargain by sacrificing certain moral intuitions, as planted in every heart & accessible via general revelation. Those intuitions aren't mere. They're also superabundantly gifted via Jesus' special revelation, which reveals that God is Abba. It makes no sense that the weight of the glory would fulfill them only by overturning them.