More Thoughts on the Proper Way to Devise an Epistemic Principle of Adequate Reason

Continuing from here.

The way I interpret and employ it is not inconsistent with believing in order to understand in terms akin to an existential disjunction. It's a pragmatic realism over against - not just presuppositionalisms, but - evidentialisms and rationalisms. It accommodates a posteriori & inductive, a priori & deductive and retortive & abductive inferences, holistically & pragmatically, combining their insights to strengthen both the uberty & security of our conclusions, which remain fallible & provisional.

Paradoxically, we can move from beliefs that start out clear but tentative but progress to those that are more obscure but more certain.

How we leap, in our proximate concerns, among competing interpretations of the origins of the quantum, the cosmos, life, sentience & symbolic language is analogous to how we leap regarding our more ultimate concerns, for example, past nihilism, solipsism, subjective idealism, pantheism, objective materialism, materialist monism, subjective materialism, Calvinism and perditionisms, libertarian & compatibilist. There are no formal, syllogistic knock-outs. They often come, rather, from a good old reductio ad absurdum, retortive performative contradictions and aesthetic primacy.

None of this is inconsistent with Kierkegaard, Tillich or William James. None of this denies how competing proximate hypotheses, physically & metaphysically, and competing ultimate worldviews, metanarratively, can be speculatively equiplausible or, per my coinage, MUTE.

It is to suggest that, when we leap, our faith is not unreasonable, that  not all speculatively equiplausible options are equally live in terms of existential actionability & practical absurdity. Our ultimate leaps, per Hans Küng, can be described as  choices between a justified fundamental trust in uncertain reality and a nowhere anchored paradoxical trust in uncertain reality. The E-PSR simply reflects Küng's disjunction and, I believe, suggests it refers to both our proximate & ultimate concerns and their probes of reality, which yield FRUIT. The anxiety that must be allayed would not derive from an aesthetic realism but from nihilism writ large.

Faith, properly conceived, is an existential disjunction or a "living as if" that is normatively justified and eminently actionable even though not otherwise robustly warranted, epistemically, via either descriptive, evidential accuracy, or interpretive, explanatory adequacy.

All an E-PAR entails, really, is that when commencing a rational inquiry of probabilistic reality, even if we don't know whether our present uncertainty comes from being methodologically thwarted, epistemically, or occulted in principle, ontically (or ontologically, one must stipulate to the former & eschew the latter. Otherwise, why bother?

Concerns about determinism in most weaker PSR versions seem overwrought. e.g. Thomism's PSR is sufficiently nuanced.

Jenson & Bracken can be interpreted as employing tripolar presencing within a three domain model of reality (infinitely & timelessly, eternally & everlastingly, temporally & transiently).

I put the following to AI - Perplexity:

Robert Jenson & Joseph Bracken employ a three domain model of reality, which includes what's infinite & timeless, eternal & everlasting and temporal & transient. How might that three domain view reconcile with eternalism, presentism and growing block universe? Bracken combines aspects of both classical theism and neo-Whiteheadian process thought.

Perplexity Responded:

Robert Jenson and Joseph Bracken’s **three-domain model of reality**—which includes the infinite and timeless, the eternal and everlasting, and the temporal and transient—offers a theological framework that could potentially reconcile aspects of **eternalism**, **presentism**, and the **growing block universe theory** by situating each within distinct domains of reality. Here's how:

1. **Infinite and Timeless (God’s Domain)**: This domain corresponds to the realm of absolute infinity, where God exists beyond time. It aligns most closely with the metaphysical implications of **eternalism**, which views all moments in time (past, present, future) as equally real. In this context, God perceives all of time simultaneously, much like the eternalist "block universe."

2. **Eternal and Everlasting (Creation/Heaven)**: This domain represents a reality that transcends temporality but still interacts with it. Theologically, it could align with the **growing block universe theory**, where creation is dynamic and continuously unfolding. The "everlasting" nature of this domain reflects the idea that new moments are constantly added to existence, akin to the growing block's expansion.

3. **Temporal and Transient (Human Experience)**: This domain corresponds to our lived experience of time as flowing and transient. It resonates with **presentism**, where only the present moment is real. Human beings experience time in this way because they are embedded in temporality.

### Reconciliation:

- The three-domain model allows for a hierarchical integration of these temporal theories. Presentism governs human experience (the temporal domain), while the growing block theory describes the unfolding nature of creation (the eternal domain). Eternalism applies at the level of divine perception (the infinite domain), where God sees all times as equally real.

- By distinguishing between these domains, Bracken’s synthesis of classical theism and process thought accommodates both the dynamism of creation (process) and God’s timelessness (classical theism), bridging gaps between these metaphysical views.

This approach provides a theological lens to harmonize differing philosophical models of time by assigning them to different levels of reality within a unified framework.

Citations:

[1] Models & mesmerism - The Cynefin Co https://thecynefin.co/models-mesmerism/

[2] Growing block universe - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Growing_block_universe

[3] [PDF] The Theological Significance of Chance https://researchoutput.csu.edu.au/files/9308407/38549

[4] The three-domain model: A new model for the early development of ... https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3548863/

[5] Eternalism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://iep.utm.edu/eternalism/

[6] In Defense of Hell: A Reply to Fr Kimel (Part 2) - Eclectic Orthodoxy https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2024/12/02/in-defense-of-hell-a-reply-to-fr-kimel-part-2/

[7] [PDF] Supreme Court of the United States https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/21/21-8144/227983/20220615123853150_Tavares%20Wright-%20Appendix-%20Volume%20IV.pdf

[8] [PDF] Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block 21 - PhilArchive https://philarchive.org/archive/MILTGB-2

Note - Original Discussion

After all, isn’t there a difference between carrying implicit metaphysical weight via an abductive inference posited hypothetically rather than as an a priori analytic syllogistic conclusion?

In other words, fallible abduction delivers pragmatic validity not metaphysical dogma. It’s an indispensable methodological stipulation not an ontological verity. It guides practical reasoning via a normatively justifiable & epistemically warranted existential “acting as if” thus & such is true.

Because beauty and harmony can serve as intuitive guides to intelligibility, and because beauty and aesthetic experience play foundational roles in shaping human understanding and values, they are related to Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, which the E-PSR might do well to explicitly adopt regarding intelligibility, generally, and our practical reasoning under uncertainty, in particular.

Also, isn’t the argument limited in scope to domains where rational inquiry operates, therefore allowing some aspects of reality to possibly be indeterminate? This does allow for brute facts regarding unexplained contingencies?

And since the examples cited throughout the argument were limited to contingent entities, its reasonable to infer, therefore, that this E-PSR version is contingently true, modally, e.g. would not apply to necessary being?

It functions only regulatively as a heuristic or condition for intelligibility, which guides inquiry without asserting universal truth?

If, *modally*, it applies to contingent, in/determinate being, and, furthermore, in the domain of in/determinate being it is limited in *scope* to only realities subject to rational inquiry, it’s a suitably weak & resilient heuristic?

In substance, I believe, therefore, that Dwayne’s Epistemic PSR is weak enough. And, since it really does boil down to only requiring “adequate” reasons (rather than exhaustive sufficient reasons), in style, it may be more felicitous to change its name to E-PAR, where A = adequate?