Possible World & Free Choice Counterfactuals of Universalism – the lack thereof

Universalists can (should!) hold that definitively rejecting God is impossible because there’s no such divinely determined possible world counterfactual, in the first place.

It necessarily follows, then, that there couldn’t be actual free choice counterfactuals regarding such final rejections, such as could even be naturally determinable by creatures. This is not to say that we aren’t co-determing all manner of other things regarding HOW (& how much) we’ll manifest Christ, modally.

The specific type & degree of theological determinism in play, above, needn’t entail that moral evil is to any extent divinely intended for its own sake, as if it might have some mysterious non-instrumental value. Rather, as consistent with our sufficient degrees of freedom & autonomy regarding all manner of other (actual) free choice counterfactuals, moral evil wouldn’t ever be interpreted as in any measure indispensable or positively willed by God, but only ever victoriously vanquished by God & to be purged by His grace.

No sufficiently free & adequately determined natural will would ever need to be competitively violated to avert any final & definitive rejection of God, as that’s a prima facie absurd conception, in the first place. As such, it’s an intrinsically impossible conception, so clearly neither a possible world nor a free choice counterfactual.

Such a rejection could not refer to any actual counterfactual, however one may otherwise choose to define competing versions of libertarian & in/compatibilist free will, which stand on their own apart from the incoherent theoanthropological presuppositions of perditionism.

No one need account for any unsavory non-instrumental accounts of moral evil due to their universalist account, alone. And, further, no Catholic compatibilist need formulate any unsavory non-instrumental account of moral evil because no valid theoanthropology can be so radically compatibilist that it would deny our belief that all grace is by definition non-necessitating or  deny that all responses to grace are, again by definition, synergistic.

Distinctions matter.

a digression …

Theoretic questions like, essentially, “What are reindeer?” and, existentially, “Do reindeer even exist?” are distinct from empirical questions like, actually, “Is that a reindeer in the bushes?”.

These distinctions are critical, for example, in moral probabilism, where we are free to employ such probabilistic reasoning for theoretic doubts of law but not for empirical doubts of fact, especially regarding grave matters where others’ intrinsic dignity & rights are at risk. We dare not risk shooting a person if we have any empirical doubt regarding what’s moving in the bushes. Moral probabilism, controversially, could be legitimate for a theoretic doubt of law regarding just what is a person, but not for empirical doubts of fact (person or reindeer?) with potentially immense practical & moral consequences.

back to universalism

Another critical distinction, not unrelated, pertains to the free choice counterfactuals of rational creatures versus the possible world counterfactuals of divine persons (not that I believe that there are “real” possibles, theologically).

We best distinguish possible & impossible from necessary & contingent, e.g. as in Peirce’s 1ns vs 3ns.

A counterfactual of free choice should be defined per a subjunctive mood in terms of what’s intrinsically possible, modally.

This should all be distinguished from a possible-world counterfactual, where information regarding what God would have willed for all possible worlds would, alone, suffice to know what’s modally necessary. Such hypothetical possible world counterfactuals would be indicative in mood and a priori exclude conceptualized absurdities.

The essential, material & final limiting potencies of determinate beings reflect the divine determinations of what’s intrinsically possible per Maximian logoi. In our cosmotheandric reality, these logoi have been gifted ex Deo as generated (via a divine personal othering) from the enhypostasized essence of the eternal Logos.

These logoi indicate what God has willed in terms of limiting potencies for our cosmotheandric determinate being. Our knowledge of Christ would thus reveal the teloi God has willed for creation. A perfect knowledge of Christ would, alone, suffice for us to know which types of limiting potencies, such as we might could conceptualize, are indeed intrinsically im/possible.

Conceptually, for example, hypothetical counterfactuals, as are indicative in mood, would a priori exclude such conceptualized absurdities as “God making a rock so big that He couldn’t pick it up.”

Also excluded would be many prima facie absurd perditionist notions. The idea that a perfectly free & perfectly rational creature could ever finally & definitively reject God is clearly excluded. Any moral intuition that could imagine that a finite creature would ever deserve an infinite punishment is also excluded.

The a priori universalist exclusion of certain prima facie absurd perditionist notions & intuitions would be based on absolute necessities as deemed im/possible per divinely determined hypothetical possible-world counterfactuals (not that one need stipulate to real “possibles” in the first place).

Such universalist exclusions do not refer, therefore, to any intrinsically possible conditional necessities that we, as rational creatures, may freely choose to actualize by our subjunctive decisions as per the God-given counterfactuals of our free choices.

To be considered sufficiently free, rational creatures need not be able to determine hypothetical possible-world counterfactuals, like which necessities are absolute or conditional, in the first place, much less which conditional necessities would be intrinsically possible or impossible.

Any internally coherent definition of a rational creature’s essential freedom would only require their capacity to determine hypothetical counterfactuals of free choice as have already been divinely determined as intrinsically possible.

Rational creatures, therefore, determine – not THAT any given conception of some putative contingency is intrinsically possible or not, but – only ever  WHICH of those intrinsically possible hypothetical counterfactuals of free choice, as real modal contingencies, get actualized.

Every real created effect requires  reductions of essential, material or final potencies by both uncreated existential, efficient or formal acts via divine energeia, as well as created existential, efficient or formal acts. In other words, our various potencies  will always be reduced by synergistic (jointly sufficient) acts (via concursus Dei). Every act of ours has some aspect & degree of goodness.

Literally, reality’s divine-human effects are co-caused by uncreated & created persons, who synergistically reduce determinate potencies, respectively, by transcendental & creaturely acts, which, even though jointly sufficient, remain metaphysically analogous. (Ergo, proceed with caution in inferring any natural determinations from this).

Premotion physica refers to  antecedent (metaphysically – not temporally) divine causes, which, jointly & sufficiently, co-reduce essential & material determinate potencies via uncreated existential & efficient acts. Other antecedent (metaphysically – not temporally) divine causes can co-reduce final determinate potencies via uncreated formal acts. Graces can operate in conjunction with any of these causes, can affect one interiorly & exteriorly, ordinarily & extraordinarily, and in terms of both frequency & amplitude.

Two Musings about the Same Topic: Just because one denies the possibility of a concrete state of pure nature doesn't mean that one can't, at the same time, affirm the possibility that one could be fully satisfied by a knowledge of God that's less than a beatific vision.

Musing #1

The possibility of a state of pure nature can be denied without undermining the gratuity of grace.

The coherence of the gratuity of grace relies on the possibility of - not some state of pure nature, but - all being differently (perhaps even uniquely) graced by divine manifestations, which can vary in kinds & degrees of presence.

We are all constitutively indwelled and all intrinsically desire every kind & degree of divine presence. Those intrinsic desires are expressed in how our pursuits of Truth, Beauty & Goodness, themselves, are their own reward. They are also experienced in our rational appetites for all that's true, beautiful & good in finite things, as they variously manifest the divine.

It's precisely because those intrinsic desires are progressively awakened --- by our synergistic cooperation with different kinds & degrees of divine manifestation --- that all needn't be equally graced to be fully satisfied. All will indeed enjoy a "full satisfaction" of such desires as will have been awakened in proportion to each's unique kinds & degrees of divine synergistic cooperation.

This is to suggest that all can be fully satisfied in direct proportion to each's unique knowledge of God, so to whatever extent that knowledge has been progressively gifted to any given person, whether in one's life of --- not only vision, but - experience (implicit) and/or faith (explicit). That's to say that one can be fully satisfied in their relationship with God whether living by the light of experience, faith or vision.

We can still deny any distinction between natural & supernatural beatitudes. Rather, we can affirm a distinction between those essential & abundant original beatitudes as are proportionate to our primary natures and those final & superabundant beatitudes as are fitting (per divine congruity) to our secondary natures, which we synergistically self-appropriate via a self-transcendence, which freely cooperates with purgative, illuminative & unitive graces.

Musing #2

Once one stipulates that we're on a soul-crafting journey from abundance to superabundance and that there's no such thing as a counterfactual of free choice, whereby one could definitively reject God, which competing theoanthropology one then chooses becomes less consequential. I'm thinking of implications for questions that would pertain to such as the gratuity of grace, the nature of human freedom, intrinsic & elicited desires, efficacious grace, predestination, theodicy concerns, etc

That said, the most coherent stance in my view is that we're constitutively indwelled and that we've an innate desire for Truth, Beauty & Goodness, in & of themselves, the pursuits of which are intrinsically rewarding. That's in addition to what we find to be instrumentally rewarding in all that's true, beautiful & good in creation. There are evolutionary interpretations for same, of course, and semiotic accounts which include absentials, ententional & intentional behaviors, teleonomic & teleological acts, etc

While there need be no concrete natura pura, still, there might be an original or essential beatitude of divine images, protologically & sub-eschatologically, as would be distinct from the final beatitude of divine likenesses, eschatologically. The telos of that final beatitude could never be foreclosed on, i.e. such potencies, as teloi of logoi, would never be obliterable or extinguishable, only ever partly eclipsable.

The idea that there could be a counterfactual of free choice vis a vis some putative definitive rejection of God is incoherent, absurd.


Ergo, the following is NOT TRUE: "One cannot deny the possibility of a 'state of pure nature' without undermining the gratuitousness of the supernatural order."