The Antecedent/Consequent Will is a Theotic - not Soteriological - Distinction
The purpose of this essay is to argue that the antecedent/consequent will distinction can hold not just provisionally but eschatologically.
The antecedent/consequent will distinction refers theotically in terms of the various modes & degrees of divinization divinely intended for all.
The distinction cannot ever be applied soteriologically in terms of whether or not each will have one's native substantial being restored from sin & death. That would be theologically problematic because it’s both logically incoherent & morally repugnant.
Provisionally, via epistemic distancings, which have both extrinsic (revelational) & intrinsic (maturational) aspects, we are transiently gifted the opportunity to formatively self-actualize our substantial being and, integrally, by that means, to most optimally transformatively transcend-self. For any given person, the divine permission of sin doesn't extend indefinitely, only historically.
The self-transcendent dynamics of theosis can be more robustly transformative for our relative being when integrated with the self-actualization dynamics of the formative maturation processes of our substantial being, historically & transiently. This is not to say that the self-transcendent dynamics of theosis don't continue, indefinitely & eschatologically, via epektasis. It's only to insist that the transient divine permission of sin is unavoidable, metaphysically, to properly provision those self-actualization dynamics of the formative maturation processes, which are, in turn, indispensable for & integral to the most optimal & robust transformative dynamics of theosis in its rudimentary stages. Eschatologically, largely due to extrinsic aspects & constraints, while growth in subjective beatitude, objective theophany & relational intimacy deepens everlastingly, the process is necessarily less robust, intrinsically. This is to say that our historical sojourns are singularly significant in the divine optimization of a maximal ecclesial unity & depth of cosmotheandric unity, theophanically. Nothing's at stake vis a vis divine intrinsic perfections, which are immutable.
Let’s frame up our fundamental questions.
For stances that affirm divine simplicity, is the antecedent/consequent will distinction logically incoherent?
Not if one buys Norris Clarke's distinction between the divine esse naturale & intentionale coupled with a further distinction between the divine intrinsic perfections & theophanic manifestations?
Are stances that affirm that we don't know whether or not all will attain a supra-theophanic vision morally repugnant and incompatible with perfect goodness?
Not if one recognizes the possibility of other modes of Christ-mediated divine union, which, while formally distinct, might each have its own "sort of rest" or "stability in the good" and could effect an eventual healing of any pain of loss or sting of remorse?
Do stances that affirm that we don't know whether or not all will attain a supra-theophanic vision entail a compromise of divine sovereignty by creaturely freedom?
Not if we want to maintain classical notions of divine predilection & eschatological hierarchies, where, even among those who attain a supra-theophanic vision, there can be differentials in degrees of beatitude & scopes of theophanic glory? Need all attain a maximal welfare, even though God intends same?
Do stances that affirm that we don't know whether or not all will attain a supra-theophanic vision make such failures seem inevitable within God’s providence, contradicting divine love & omnipotence and undermining the universality & indivisibility of God’s will & love?
Why? What, in principle, would foreclose on a subjunctive apokatastasis or lead one to a pessimistic "census"?
Do stances that affirm that we don't know whether or not all will attain a supra-theophanic vision introduce a dualism or division in God’s will in a way that's theologically problematic?
Again, not if one recognizes the possibility of other modes of Christ-mediated divine union, which, while formally distinct, might each have its own "sort of rest" or "stability in the good" and could effect an eventual healing of any pain of loss or sting of remorse? Not if there can be differentials in degrees of beatitude & scopes of theophanic glory per eschatological hierarchies? Need all attain a maximal welfare, even though God intends same?
Need stances that affirm that we don't know whether or not all will attain a supra-theophanic vision be considered merely permissive & retributive and not sufficiently theophanic and restorative?
Not if one recognizes the possibility of other modes of Christ-mediated divine union, which could effect an eventual healing of any pain of loss or sting of remorse?
Sin is permitted, historically & provisionally, to optimize the maximal divinization of all persons, ecclesiologically. Eschatologically, though, sin is - not only conquered, but - vanquished in a manner that both prevents further resistance to God's will & restores the essential mode & degree of divine union of each & every person, individually.
If the antecedent/consequent divine will distinction applies to the synergistic co-self-determinations of our tropic BECOMING, that would entail that, while God antecedently wills our maximal divinization, He consequently permits our realization of submaximal modes & degrees of divine union.
At the same time, if the antecedent/consequent divine will distinction does not apply to the divine transcendental determinations of our essential BEING, that might entail that, while God would certainly permit our realization of submaximal modes & degrees of divine union, still, He would positively will & ensure the restoration of our substantial being to its native mode & degree of divine union.
Historically, then, persons could be divinely permitted to resist God's will, only provisionally so, toward the end of optimally realizing each's maximal divinization, while, eschatologically, persons would not be permitted to continue to resist God's will, indefintely so, because that would parasitize their substantial being and deprive them of that native mode & degree of divine union, which God has transcendentally determined - thus guaranteeing what's essential for each.
It's not that persons are not intrinsically oriented to each & every mode & degree of divine union (meaning that the obediential potencies of same are far more than mere non-repugnances), but the sublative nature of these successive modes entails that persons are largely unaware of such unitive dynamics, our eyes having not seen, ears having not heard & hearts having not conceived same. This is to recognize that such self-determined deprivations of same (maximal intimacies) would not function as punishments (dis/proportional or not).
transcendental determinations of BEING
soteriological, essential, substantial, native, original, ontological, primary nature, secondary beatitude, theophanic, provisional, formative, maturational, moral perfection, historical, transcendentally determined, formative or maturational processes whereby we actualize our substantial being, purgative restoration of substantial BEING
co-self-determinations of BECOMING
theotic, epektatic, formal, modal, tropic, accidental, relative, secondary nature, primary beatitude, supra-theophanic, transformative, supererogatory perfectibility, eschatological, synergistically co-self-determined, sanctifying transformation of accidental being, BECOMING
If the distinction between what God positively wills and what He merely permits holds in general regarding God's Providence (e.g. He merely permits sin), then what principled difference could there be between a created person being permitted to:
1. resist God's will once;
2. resist it habitually throughout one's life or
3. resist it indefinitely, eschatologically.
For starters, by definition, no finite creature, when fully rational & completely free, could definitively reject the divine presence. A defintive rejection of God, then, is never a free will counterfactual because, in the first place, it’s not even a possible world counterfactual. Finite creatures can only ever reject God in part, not wholly. While they can be fully culpable for a partial rejection, they could never be absolutely culpable for any so-called definitive rejection.
Grounded in different understandings of freedom, universalists don't even recognize the implicitly presupposed definition of resist employed here. Specifically, they don't take that degree of rejection, i.e. absolute, to be a free will counterfactual. That's because, per their theological anthropology, it's not even a possible world counterfactual.
Furthermore, universalists don't recognize a "capacity to sin" as a divinely intended essential potency of substantial being. Rather, it's an unavoidable, divinely permitted, incidental subcontrary that can parasitize same.
This divine permission of sin (again, a relative rejection) is only historical but not eschatological because it's only a metaphysically unavoidable possibility for epistemically distanced rational creatures.
What this epistemic distancing provisions is an enriched notion of freedom that's further enhanced by a co-self-determinative autonomy, which ultimately deliberates - not whether, but - both how & how much divine intimacy, theophany & beatitude each person would to realize.
It's the nature of the epistemic closures that will be occasioned during our post-mortem transitionings that accounts for the differences in our historical - eschatological volitional dynamics. Extrinsically the creature's environment is radically changed thus intrinsically impacting its overall well being (holistically conceived). For example, even before having one's vicious nature purged thereby attaining an intrinsic stability in the good, one could also attain a practical impeccability, extrinsically, lacking occasions to sin.
While a rational creature can ignore or disregard what's offered to the intellect, it can't totally ignore all beauty, goodness & truth when willing. This is because a person's deliberative capacity is itself inalienably constituted, as a divine image, in relation to beauty, goodness & truth.
Even if we would stipulate that the divine permission of sin, itself, wouldn't extend indefinitely and that that divine permission would apply only provisionally & historically, that needn't entail that sin's consequences couldn't extend eschatologically. In other words, God made us to move forward but at some risk of our temporarily falling backward. He will not forsake us by allowing us to suffer any disproportional (infinite) consequences or punishment of such backsliding (finite), but will restore each to her substantial being & essential felicity.
How and why this works for me is complicated, but, while it seems to me like some minimal, essential mode & degree of Christ-mediated union would, indeed, be transcendentally determined, in my view, there's nothing logically incoherent or morally unintelligible in the notion that, while He might antecedently will everyone's maximal unitive attainment, God needn't guarantee same.
For the most robustly unitive theosis conceivable to me, while a divine permission of sin would be unavoidable for theosis in its rudimentary stages, beyond that, it could devolve into - not only a suboptimal, but - counterproductive dynamic. For that reason, in principle, any divine permission of sin would extend only historically for provisional purposes but be precluded eschatologically.
Soteriologically, regarding our substantial being, all will be saved from sin & death and realize essential (constitutive) modes & degrees of subjective beatitude, objective theophany & interpersonal unity as transcendentally determined.
Theotically, regarding our relative being, all will synergistically co-self-determine and realize additional (superabundant) modes & degrees of subjective beatitude, objective theophany & interpersonal unity.
We know that God antecedently wills each person's maximal realization of all potential modes & degrees of subjective beatitude, objective theophany & interpersonal unity. We don't know His consequent will in this regard, only that no one will suffer disproportional consequences.
In addition to invoking the historical - eschatological distinction coupled with the logic of the permission of sin's provisional nature, we need to further establish a proportionality objection.
The permission of sin historically provisions our developmental formative moral maturations & incipient transformative superorgatory realizations. It facilitates a richer exercise of freedom through such an enhanced potential as will allow each to autonomously co-self-determine (via deliberative choosing) both how & how much they'll expresses their unique Christ-likeness.
Beyond a nascent stability in the good (essential moral perfection & impeccability), whether attained via mostly intrinsic co-self-determinations ante-mortem or graced purgations of viscious habits post-mortem, each will be poised to continue to progressively realize certain (some? all?) modes of divine union by way of the successive (and sublative) supererogatory graduations of epektasis. Any provisional, developmental permission of sin is now obviated by each's moral perfection.
A question might beg regarding the universality of those post-mortem graced purgations of viscious habits. I assert their universality by grounding same in a proportionality objection, maintaining that to allow any everlasting parasitization of a person's substantial being would prima facie be a disproportional consequence or punishment for any sin a finite creature could possibly commit.
Historically, it plays a provisional role, developmentally, in our formative self-actualization and transformative self-transcendence. Eschatologically, once purged by grace of any viscious habits and gifted a nascent stability in the good, i.e. sans peccability, we can still further realize (deliberatively so) our infinite virtuous perfectibility via our epektatic growth in supererogatory virtue.
Our essential moral virtue of our substantial being, as divine images, has been transcendentally determined. As we actualize our substantial being, formatively, our essential moral virtue can get parasitized by our vicious acts and habits. That divine permission of sin, while a structurally necessary phase of our formative maturation in moral virtue, is transient, provisional & remediable, soteriologically. We can not only be restored by purgative graces to our essential moral virtue but can be gifted a stability in the good. What it provides us is the opportunity for a human freedom that's further enriched by an enhanced autonomy or co-self-determination, as ordered toward our unique self-appropriation of Christ-likeness. We realize our uniqueness, theotically, in how we deliberately choose both how & how much we'll experience subjective beatitude, express objective theophany & enjoy divine union. This process refers to our transformative growth in supererogatory virtue.
Our formative maturation in moral virtue and transformative growth in supererogatory virtue are integrally intertwined. The divine permission of sin is a provisional, structurally necessary phase of our development in virtue during our historical sojourns. Eschatologically, it's not operative and would contribute nothing to our epektatic growth in supererogatory virtue, where we'll enjoy our infinite virtuous perfectibility.
Deep Seek responds:
The question posed by Fr. James Dominic Rooney challenges the coherence of universal reconciliation (*apokatastasis*) by probing the distinction between God’s positive will and permissive will, particularly regarding creaturely resistance to God. How might universalists like **David Bentley Hart**, **Jordan Daniel Wood**, and **John Sobert Sylvest** respond? Their answers would likely draw on metaphysical, Christological, and eschatological principles central to their thought. Here’s a synthesized possible response:
---
### **1. Rejecting a Strict Dualism of Willing/Permitting**
Universalists of this stripe often argue that God’s will is fundamentally **unitive**—that is, even divine "permission" is ultimately ordered toward the good. Hart, for instance, rejects the idea that God’s permissive will is a passive allowance of evil *for its own sake*; rather, it is a *pedagogical* or *teleological* allowance within the broader arc of redemption. Thus, the distinction between "willing" and "permitting" is not absolute but a temporal accommodation to creaturely freedom.
- **Key Point:** If God’s permission is always *instrumental* to a greater good (like the healing of the creature), then there is no *ultimate* difference between temporary and permanent resistance—because God’s providence ensures that resistance is never finally victorious.
---
### **2. Christological Resolution: The Inevitability of Submission**
For thinkers like **Jordan Daniel Wood** (following **Maximus the Confessor**), all creaturely resistance is *deficient motion*—a failure to participate rightly in God’s energy. But because Christ has assumed human nature, even the most recalcitrant will must eventually be *recapitulated* into divine love.
- **Key Argument:** Just as Christ’s descent into hell (the *Harrowing of Hades*) liberates all souls, so too must all resistance ultimately be "exhausted" in the face of divine love. There is no *principled* difference between (1), (2), and (3) because *all* resistance is finite and cannot eternally withstand God’s infinite persuasive love.
---
### **3. Eschatological Transformation of Freedom**
Universalists argue that true freedom is not the libertarian capacity to reject God *ad infinitum* but the *realized capacity* to love God fully.
- **David Bentley Hart** (e.g., in *That All Shall Be Saved*) argues that an eternal hell would imply a *defect* in creation, not a true expression of freedom.
- **John Sobert Sylvest** (drawing on Peircean semiotics and process thought) might say that resistance is always *provisional* within an evolving, teleological creation.
Thus, while God permits resistance *provisionally* (e.g., for pedagogical or developmental reasons), there is no *final* state where resistance persists, because God’s love is *irresistible* in the sense that it *transforms* the will rather than overrides it.
---
### **4. No "Neutral" Permissive Will in Eternity**
Fr. Rooney’s question assumes that God’s permissive will could extend infinitely, but universalists would argue that divine permission is *temporally bounded* by God’s eschatological victory.
- **Analogy:** Just as a parent may permit a child’s tantrum but does not (and *cannot*) permit it *forever*, God’s allowance of sin is always ordered toward healing.
- **Metaphysical Claim:** Since evil has no *ontological substance* (per classical theism), it cannot sustain itself eternally.
Thus, (3) ("resist indefinitely") is metaphysically impossible—not because God *coerces*, but because resistance, when fully known for what it is (*à la* Hart’s "no one chooses hell rationally"), collapses.
---
### **Conclusion: No Final Dualism of Wills**
The universalist response would deny that there is a *principled* difference between temporary and eternal resistance because:
1. God’s permission is always subordinate to His redemptive purpose.
2. Christ’s victory ensures that no resistance is ontologically final.
3. True freedom is not the ability to resist forever, but the liberation from the illusion that resistance is desirable.
In short, the distinction between (1), (2), and (3) collapses in the eschaton, because God’s love is *irresistible not by force but by truth*.
Gemini responds:
That's a fascinating question posed by Fr. Rooney, and it cuts right to the heart of the universalist understanding of God's will and providence. Here's how David Bentley Hart, Jordan Daniel Wood, and John Sobert Sylvest might respond, highlighting their shared commitments and potential nuances in their approaches:
Shared Core Tenets of Universalism:
Before diving into the specifics, it's crucial to remember that these thinkers generally affirm:
* God's Universal Salvific Will: They believe God actively wills the salvation of all creation and every individual. This isn't a passive desire but an efficacious and ultimately irresistible intention.
* The Primacy of God's Positive Will: They tend to emphasize what God positively wills as the ultimate reality, with permission serving a subordinate and temporary role within that overarching will.
* The Nature of God as Love: Their understanding of God is fundamentally rooted in perfect and boundless love, which they argue cannot ultimately fail in its desire for union with all creation.
* Eschatological Hope: They hold a strong hope, if not certainty, in the final reconciliation of all things to God.
Possible Responses:
Considering these shared tenets, here's how they might address Fr. Rooney's question:
David Bentley Hart:
Hart would likely argue that the distinction between God's positive will and mere permission, while having some provisional validity in our temporal experience, cannot hold as an ultimate or eschatological reality. He might say:
* The Nature of Permission: God's permission of sin and resistance is not an arbitrary act but a temporary allowance for the sake of creaturely freedom and the unfolding of the drama of creation. However, this permission is always circumscribed by God's overarching positive will for reconciliation.
* The Scandal of Eternal Damnation: Hart finds the idea of eternal, unrepented resistance fundamentally incompatible with the nature of God's love and the ultimate triumph of Christ. He would likely see it as a defeat of God's positive will.
* The "Principled Difference" Dissolves: For Hart, there is no principled difference eschatologically. Whether one resists once, habitually, or seemingly indefinitely, God's relentless love and the power of theosis will eventually draw all created beings into union with Him. The "indefinite" resistance cannot ultimately thwart God's positive and irresistible will. He might emphasize the transformative and purgatorial aspects of the eschaton that ultimately heal and reconcile.
Jordan Daniel Wood:
Wood, drawing on his Thomistic and patristic insights, might approach this by emphasizing the dynamic interplay between divine causality and creaturely freedom, but ultimately affirming the priority of God's salvific will:
* God's Permissive Will as Ordered to His Positive Will: Wood would likely argue that God's permission of resistance is not an end in itself but is ordered towards the ultimate fulfillment of His positive will for union. Creaturely freedom, while real, operates within the bounds of God's providential plan.
* The Problem of "Indefinite" Resistance: Wood might contend that "indefinite" resistance implies a fundamental and permanent frustration of God's loving intentions, which seems inconsistent with God's omnipotence and the nature of divine love as understood through the lens of universal salvific will.
* Theological Consistency: He would likely argue that a principled distinction leading to eternal, unrepented resistance creates a theological inconsistency, where creaturely freedom ultimately triumphs over God's loving and efficacious will for all. The eschaton, for Wood, must ultimately reflect the victory of God's positive will.
John Sobert Sylvest:
Sylvest, with his emphasis on the transformative power of God's grace and the implications of the incarnation, might respond by focusing on the ultimate efficacy of Christ's work:
* Christ's Victory Over Sin and Death: Sylvest would likely highlight that Christ's death and resurrection are not just for some but for all humanity, overcoming the power of sin and death that enables resistance to God.
* The Inevitable Pull of Grace: He might argue that while creatures can resist grace temporarily, the ultimate pull of God's love, revealed most fully in Christ, is irresistible in the long run. The eschaton will be the manifestation of this ultimate victory of grace.
* The Absurdity of Final Defeat: For Sylvest, the idea that some could eternally resist God's love would represent a fundamental failure of God's plan in Christ, which he would likely find theologically untenable. The "indefinite" resistance is ultimately overcome by the transformative power of God's grace in the eschaton.
In Summary:
All three thinkers would likely argue that while there might be a temporary distinction in our experience between different levels of resistance, eschatologically, there cannot be a principled difference that allows for the permanent frustration of God's universal salvific will. They would contend that God's love and power will ultimately prevail, drawing all creation into reconciliation and union with Him. The idea of an "indefinite" or eternal resistance would be seen as incompatible with the fundamental nature of God as love and the ultimate triumph of His positive will. They might differ in their specific theological language and emphasis, but their underlying commitment to universal reconciliation would lead them to a similar conclusion.
Perplexity responds:
Universalist thinkers like David Bentley Hart, Jordan Daniel Wood, and John Sobert Sylvest would respond to Fr. James Dominic Rooney’s challenge by grounding their arguments in three key theological principles: **God’s absolute goodness**, **the transformative power of Christ’s incarnation**, and **the teleological structure of divine permission**. Here’s how they might address the question of principled differences between temporary and eternal resistance to God’s will:
---
### 1. **God’s Antecedent Will and the Telos of Permission**
Universalists distinguish between God’s **antecedent will** (His desire for all to be saved) and His **consequent will** (permission of evil as a means to a greater end). Hart argues that God permits resistance only insofar as it serves the ultimate good of creaturely freedom and union with Him[1][5].
- **Temporary resistance** (cases 1 and 2) is permitted as part of the *pedagogical process* of spiritual growth, where even sin becomes a "weapon" for overcoming itself through Christ’s redemptive work[2][6].
- **Indefinite resistance** (case 3), however, would violate the *telos* of creation. For Hart, God’s act of creation cannot logically enfold a final, unredeemed evil (like eternal hell) without reducing His goodness to a "merely relative" quality[1][5]. Eternal resistance would imply God’s failure to reconcile all things, contradicting His nature as Love[3][6].
---
### 2. **Christ’s Efficacious Grace and the Transformation of Freedom**
Jordan Daniel Wood, drawing on Maximus the Confessor, emphasizes that Christ’s incarnation and crucifixion **redefine human freedom** itself. By assuming human nature, Christ “condemned sin in the flesh” and transformed death into a tool for defeating resistance[2][6].
- Human resistance is always **provisional** because Christ’s grace works *within* the very structure of creaturely freedom. Wood argues that God’s providence ensures even habitual resistance is “hypostatically” assumed and healed in Christ[2].
- To permit *eternal* resistance would require God to sustain a contradiction: a creature persisting in rebellion against its own *telos* (union with God). For Wood, this is ontologically impossible because Christ’s resurrection has already “converted the use of death” into a means of salvation[2][6].
---
### 3. **Divine Freedom vs. Arbitrary Permission**
John Sobert Sylvest and Hart critique Rooney’s framing of divine freedom as requiring the ability to “do otherwise.” They argue God’s freedom is not about arbitrary choices but **acting in accordance with His nature**[4][6].
- God cannot permit eternal resistance because it would violate His **identity as Love**. Hart writes, “If God’s ‘venture’ in creating is infinite, the final end must be its whole moral truth”[3]. Eternal hell would render God’s creative act a moral failure[1][5].
- Sylvest adds that Rooney’s view risks a “divine voluntarism” where God’s choices are unmoored from His essence. Universalists assert that God’s permission is always **subordinate to His promise** to “unite all things in Christ” (Eph 1:10)[6].
---
### Conclusion: The Impossibility of Eternal Resistance
For these universalists, the distinction between temporary and eternal permission hinges on **God’s nature and the logic of redemption**:
- **Temporary resistance** is permitted as a *means* to heal fractured freedom.
- **Eternal resistance** is impossible because it would negate God’s victory in Christ and His identity as the Good. As Hart states, “A God who could tolerate eternal loss would not be God at all”[1][5].
In short, universalists reject the idea that God’s permission could extend indefinitely, since eschatological grace-rooted in Christ’s resurrection-ensures all resistance is ultimately overcome[2][6].
Citations:
[1] David B. Hart on “What God Wills and What God Permits” https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2020/05/05/david-b-hart-on-what-god-wills-and-what-god-permits/
[2] Jordan Daniel Wood and Maximus on the Answer to Hegel https://forgingploughshares.org/2023/04/06/jordan-daniel-wood-and-maximus-on-the-answer-to-hegel/
[3] God's Eschatological Salvific Will: Revisiting Hart's Moral Argument ... https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2023/02/13/gods-eschatological-salvific-will-revisiting-harts-moral-argument-for-universalism/
[4] James Dominic Rooney's Critique of Universalism | Eclectic Orthodoxy https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2022/11/20/james-dominic-rooneys-critique-of-universalism/
[5] David Bentley Hart and the Moral Argument Against Hell https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2021/01/24/david-bentley-hart-and-the-moral-argument-against-hell/
[6] The Coherence of Universalism: A Response to James Dominic ... https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2023/04/11/the-coherence-of-universalism-a-response-to-james-dominic-rooney-part-two/
[7] How universalists respond to arguments for Limited Atonement https://www.reddit.com/r/ChristianUniversalism/comments/1jhz230/how_universalists_respond_to_arguments_for/
[8] Three Biblical Arguments Against Universalism | Rethinking Hell https://rethinkinghell.com/2017/11/18/three-biblical-arguments-against-universalism/
[9] [PDF] Free Will, the Nous and Divine Judgment https://www.clarion-journal.com/files/free-will-the-nous-and-divine-judgment-a-critical-analysis-of-three-visions-of-universalism-.pdf
[10] Jordan Daniel Wood on the Fall, Suffering, and Theodicy https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2022/07/30/jordan-daniel-wood-on-the-fall-suffering-and-theodicy/
[11] Predestined to Glory: The Extravagant, Prodigal, and Omnipotent ... https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2023/06/17/predestined-to-glory-the-extravagant-prodigal-and-omnipotent-love-of-god/
[12] How to Understand Foreknowledge/Providence? - Reddit https://www.reddit.com/r/CatholicPhilosophy/comments/15i7lqw/how_to_understand_foreknowledgeprovidence/
[13] God's Eschatological Salvific Will: Revisiting Hart's Moral Argument ... https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2023/02/13/gods-eschatological-salvific-will-revisiting-harts-moral-argument-for-universalism/
[14] Divine freedom and heresy - Edward Feser http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2022/10/divine-freedom-and-heresy.html
[15] [PDF] Banez's Big Problem: The Ground of Freedom - PhilArchive https://philarchive.org/archive/ROOBBP
[16] [DOC] An Augustinian Response to Divine Hiddenness Arguments https://philarchive.org/archive/ROOWDI
[17] Is Christian Universalism Compatible With Free Will? Justice? Hell? https://www.benjaminlcorey.com/is-christian-universalism-compatible-with-free-will-justice-hell/
[18] David Bentley Hart's Universalism: Part two. Some Reflections on ... https://gaudiumetspes22.com/blog/david-bentley-harts-universalism-part-two-some-reflections-on-that-all-shall-be-saved
[19] What God Wills and What God Permits - Public Orthodoxy https://publicorthodoxy.org/2020/05/05/what-god-wills-and-what-god-permits/
[20] Book Review: Hart's “That All Shall Be Saved” https://orthodoxchristiantheology.com/2019/10/31/book-review-harts-that-all-shall-be-saved/
[21] Interview with David Bentley Hart - The Continuum http://anglicancontinuum.blogspot.com/2006/05/interview-with-david-bentley-hart.html
[22] Why God Couldn't Have Created Us Already Perfect https://onancientpaths.substack.com/p/why-god-couldnt-have-created-us-already
[23] Ask Fr. James Dominic Rooney, OP anything about Hell ... - YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6_BGXl3X2-o
[24] The Incoherencies of Hard Universalism | Church Life Journal https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/the-incoherencies-of-hard-universalism/
[25] Not a Hope in Hell Interview w/ Fr. James Dominic Rooney - YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tenuna1QwEU
[26] Not a Hope in Hell by Fr Rooney – where I resonate & where I struggle https://theologoumenon.substack.com/p/not-a-hope-in-hell-by-fr-rooney-where
[27] Towards a biblical view of universalism - The Gospel Coalition https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/themelios/article/towards-a-biblical-view-of-universalism/
[28] The Essential Role of Free Will in Universal Reconciliation https://forum.evangelicaluniversalist.com/t/the-essential-role-of-free-will-in-universal-reconciliation/262
[29] Universalism: A Summary Defense - Experimental Theology http://experimentaltheology.blogspot.com/2009/12/universalism-summary-defense.html
[30] Thomas Aquinas on Evil and Human Freedom, with Critique of ... https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2020/09/23/thomas-aquinas-on-evil-and-human-freedom-with-critique-of-universal-salvation/
[31] Responding to a Calvinist - The Evangelical Universalist Forum https://forum.evangelicaluniversalist.com/t/responding-to-a-calvinist/13835
ChatGPT responds:
Universalists like David Bentley Hart, Jordan Daniel Wood, and John Sobert Sylvest would likely challenge the coherence and moral implications of Rooney’s question, especially its reliance on a voluntarist or permission-based model of divine will. Here's how they might respond, drawing on their typical themes:
1. Denial of a Dual-Will Framework
They often reject the strict Thomist/Scholastic distinction between God's antecedent and consequent will (or positive will vs. permissive will) as incoherent when applied to eternal damnation.
• Hart would argue that positing God as merely permitting eternal resistance is still morally and metaphysically untenable if God foreknows this outcome and creates anyway. If God is the ground of all being and goodness, then God’s will must be effectively good for all, not merely permissively tolerating evil forever.
• Wood, influenced by Maximus and Eriugena, would likely emphasize that divine will and human will are not in ontological rivalry. Thus, the idea of “permitted” infinite resistance misunderstands the nature of deified freedom: eventually, all logoi must return to the Logos.
• Sylvest might point out that framing the issue in terms of God “permitting” rebellion misunderstands divine-human relationality—grace is ultimately irresistible because it is the gift of divine intimacy, not an external force.
2. Questioning the Moral and Metaphysical Viability of Eternal Resistance
They would ask: What could it even mean to resist God “indefinitely” when one's very being is contingent on God’s loving will?
• Hart in That All Shall Be Saved argues it is a contradiction to say that a finite will could eternally frustrate the infinite good. To allow eternal rebellion is to posit a disintegrated or irrational will surviving by divine permission—something metaphysically absurd and morally grotesque.
• Wood might invoke apokatastatic metaphysics: all things return to God not by coercion, but by the full realization of their nature in Christ, the Logos. Thus, final resistance is ontologically unsustainable.
• Sylvest could echo Bulgakov’s or sophiological intuitions: that the divine-human relationship is dynamic and eschatologically open, and God’s refusal to abandon any creature ultimately triumphs.
3. Christocentric Theophanic Logic
All three might stress that the Incarnation and Cross reveal a God who enters even into hell (Sheol, death, alienation) not to permit it eternally but to transform and transfigure it.
• So, from a Christocentric lens, eschatological resistance isn’t permitted indefinitely—it’s overcome by divine self-giving.
• Eternal resistance would imply a creature permanently opaque to the divine light—a denial of theosis and the participatory metaphysics these thinkers affirm.
Conclusion
They’d likely argue that Rooney’s framing rests on assumptions they reject:
• a libertarian and voluntarist account of will;
• a juridical and extrinsic notion of permission;
• and a metaphysics that doesn’t fully realize the implications of divine love and Christological finality.
Instead, they would insist that God’s will is not merely permissive but ultimately efficacious, not by force, but by the unfailing beauty, goodness, and truth of the divine love that draws all things to itself.
Would you like me to condense this into a dialogue-style response as if each universalist were answering Rooney directly?
Grok responds:
Universalists like David Bentley Hart, Jordan Daniel Wood, and John Sobert Sylvest would likely respond to Fr. James Dominic Rooney’s question by challenging the theological and metaphysical assumptions underlying the distinction between what God positively wills and what God merely permits, particularly in the context of divine providence, sin, and eschatology. Their responses would likely emphasize the incoherence of eternal resistance to God’s will, the nature of divine love and goodness, and the ultimate reconciliation of all things in God (apokatastasis). Below, I outline how each might approach Rooney’s question, drawing on their known theological positions and the broader universalist framework, while addressing the three scenarios (resisting once, habitually, or indefinitely).
---
### **David Bentley Hart’s Response**
David Bentley Hart, a prominent advocate for universal salvation, would likely argue that the premise of Rooney’s question—namely, the distinction between God’s positive will and permissive will—introduces a problematic dualism that undermines the coherence of God’s nature as infinite love and goodness. Hart’s universalism, as articulated in *That All Shall Be Saved* (2019), rests on the conviction that God’s love is unconditional and that the notion of eternal resistance to God is metaphysically absurd.
1. **Resisting God’s Will Once**:
Hart would likely contend that a single act of resistance (sin) is a finite act rooted in ignorance or misapprehension of the Good, which is God. Since God is the source of all being and goodness, any act of resistance is ultimately a failure to fully apprehend God’s love. Hart argues that God’s grace is not contingent on human merit but is an expression of God’s nature, which seeks to restore all creatures to their natural end in communion with Him. A single act of resistance, therefore, would be overcome by the infinite love of God, which works to heal and enlighten the sinner over time, whether in this life or the eschaton.[](https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/condemned-to-salvation-considering-universalism-with-david-bentley-hart/)
2. **Resisting Habitually Throughout One’s Life**:
Habitual resistance, for Hart, would still be a finite series of acts, limited by the temporal nature of human existence. He would argue that such resistance does not alter the fundamental orientation of the human will toward the Good, which is intrinsic to human nature as created by God. Hart rejects the notion that human freedom could eternally oppose God, as freedom is not an arbitrary capacity to choose between good and evil but a rational orientation toward the Good. Habitual sin, while serious, is a distortion that God’s grace can and will ultimately rectify, as God’s love is not conditioned by human failure. Hart might cite 1 Corinthians 15:28, where God becomes “all in all,” as evidence that no creature can remain perpetually alienated.[](https://www.postost.net/2019/10/eschatological-horizons-david-bentley-harts-universalism)
3. **Resisting Indefinitely, Eschatologically**:
Hart would likely find the idea of indefinite, eschatological resistance to be the most problematic of Rooney’s scenarios. He argues that the notion of a creature’s finite freedom eternally resisting God’s infinite love presupposes a metaphysical absurdity: that a contingent will could possess a power equal to or greater than the divine will that sustains it. For Hart, eternal resistance implies a dualistic ontology where evil or human defiance could exist co-eternally with God, which contradicts the classical theistic view of God as the sole source of being. He would assert that God’s permissive will cannot allow for eternal separation because it would violate God’s nature as the Good, who wills the salvation of all (1 Timothy 2:4). Instead, Hart envisions the eschaton as a process of purification (e.g., through a “refining fire” as in 1 Corinthians 3:13-15), where all resistance is ultimately overcome by God’s love, leading to universal reconciliation.[](https://christianscholars.com/shall-all-be-saved-david-bentley-harts-vision-of-universal-reconciliation-an-extended-review/)[](https://x.com/RxOnlyFL/status/1918796944777830435)
Hart might further critique Rooney’s framework by arguing that the distinction between God’s positive and permissive will is a theological contrivance that fails to account for the unity of God’s will. If God permits sin, it is only because He intends to bring about a greater good that defeats all evil, as seen in the atonement and the eschatological victory of Christ (1 Corinthians 15:28). To allow eternal resistance would be to concede that God’s love is not truly infinite or efficacious, a position Hart finds untenable.[](https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/hard-universalism-grace-and-creaturely-freedom/)
---
### **Jordan Daniel Wood’s Response**
Jordan Daniel Wood, whose work engages deeply with patristic theology (especially Maximus the Confessor) and metaphysical questions, would likely approach Rooney’s question by emphasizing the participatory ontology of creation and the transformative power of divine grace. Wood’s universalist leanings, as seen in his discussions of Maximus, suggest that he views the eschaton as the fulfillment of creation’s telos in God, where all resistance is ultimately resolved.
1. **Resisting God’s Will Once**:
Wood might argue that a single act of resistance is a moment of creaturely freedom that, while real, is conditioned by the finitude and contingency of the creature. Drawing on Maximus, he could assert that human freedom operates within the framework of God’s logos (divine purpose) for each creature, which is oriented toward deification (theosis). A single sin, therefore, is a deviation from this logos but does not negate the creature’s ontological dependence on God. Wood might suggest that God’s permissive will allows such acts as part of the dynamic process of creation moving toward its eschatological fulfillment, where even sinful acts are woven into the tapestry of divine providence.[](https://davidbentleyhart.substack.com/p/three-quick-announcements)
2. **Resisting Habitually Throughout One’s Life**:
For Wood, habitual resistance would represent a more entrenched distortion of the creature’s natural will, but it would not constitute an eternal barrier to God’s grace. He might draw on Maximus’s distinction between the natural will (oriented toward God) and the gnomic will (subject to deliberation and error). Habitual sin reflects a misuse of the gnomic will, but the natural will remains oriented toward God. Wood could argue that God’s permissive will allows habitual sin only insofar as it serves the greater purpose of drawing creatures to repentance and deification, either in this life or in the eschaton. Maximus’s theology, as Wood interprets it, suggests that all creation is moving toward a universal restoration, where even habitual resistance is overcome by God’s transformative love.[](https://davidbentleyhart.substack.com/p/three-quick-announcements)
3. **Resisting Indefinitely, Eschatologically**:
Wood would likely reject the possibility of indefinite resistance as incompatible with the metaphysics of creation. Following Maximus, he might argue that creatures exist only by participating in God’s being, and thus their freedom is not an autonomous power capable of eternal opposition. Indefinite resistance would imply a creaturely capacity to exist independently of God, which is metaphysically impossible. Wood could point to Maximus’s vision of the eschaton, where all things are recapitulated in Christ, as evidence that God’s will ultimately prevails. Even if Maximus maintained an “honorable silence” on universalism, Wood argues that his theology is “irresistibly universalist in its logic,” suggesting that eternal resistance is incoherent within a participatory ontology. Wood might also critique Rooney’s distinction between God’s positive and permissive will as insufficiently attentive to the unity of God’s purpose, which is to bring all creation into communion with Himself.[](https://davidbentleyhart.substack.com/p/three-quick-announcements)
---
### **John Sobert Sylvest’s Response**
John Sobert Sylvest, a less widely known but philosophically sophisticated universalist, integrates insights from process theology, panentheism, and classical theism. His response to Rooney’s question would likely emphasize the relational and teleological nature of God’s providence, where all creaturely resistance is ultimately subsumed into God’s redemptive plan.
1. **Resisting God’s Will Once**:
Sylvest might frame a single act of resistance as a moment of creaturely freedom that reflects the relational dynamics of God’s providence. Drawing on process or panentheistic insights, he could argue that God’s permissive will allows such acts to foster the growth of creatures toward greater freedom and love. A single sin, while a departure from God’s will, is not an insurmountable barrier; it is an opportunity for God’s grace to work through persuasion rather than coercion, aligning the creature with its ultimate telos in God. Sylvest’s approach would likely emphasize that God’s love is patient and persistent, capable of overcoming even the most fleeting resistance.
2. **Resisting Habitually Throughout One’s Life**:
Habitual resistance, for Sylvest, would represent a more complex challenge but not an ultimate obstacle to God’s will. He might argue that God’s providence operates through a relational process, where habitual sin is met with divine invitation and transformative grace. Sylvest could draw on the idea that human freedom is not static but evolves through interaction with God’s love. Even a lifetime of resistance is finite and cannot outlast the infinite resourcefulness of God’s redemptive love. He might also suggest that God’s permissive will allows habitual sin as part of the broader narrative of creation’s journey toward eschatological fulfillment, where all things are reconciled.
3. **Resisting Indefinitely, Eschatologically**:
Sylvest would likely reject the possibility of indefinite resistance as incompatible with the teleological structure of creation. In his framework, God’s providence is oriented toward the ultimate reconciliation of all things, and creaturely freedom is not an absolute autonomy but a participation in God’s relational love. Eternal resistance would imply a dualistic ontology where creatures could exist apart from God, which Sylvest would find incoherent. He might argue that God’s permissive will is not a passive allowance of eternal separation but an active engagement with creatures, drawing them inexorably toward their true end. Sylvest’s universalism would likely affirm that the eschaton is the culmination of God’s redemptive work, where all resistance is overcome through love, not coercion, ensuring the salvation of all.
---
### **Common Themes and Critique of Rooney’s Framework**
All three universalists would likely converge on several key points in responding to Rooney’s question:
1. **The Incoherence of Eternal Resistance**: Hart, Wood, and Sylvest would argue that eternal resistance to God’s will is metaphysically impossible because creatures are contingent beings sustained by God. The notion of a finite will eternally opposing an infinite divine will presupposes a power that creatures do not possess.[](https://x.com/RxOnlyFL/status/1918796944777830435)
2. **God’s Unconditional Love**: They would emphasize that God’s love is unconditional and efficacious, seeking the salvation of all without exception (1 Timothy 2:4). The distinction between God’s positive and permissive will, as Rooney frames it, risks introducing conditions on divine love that undermine its infinity.[](https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2023/02/23/an-open-letter-to-fr-james-dominic-rooney/)
3. **Eschatological Reconciliation**: Universalists view the eschaton as the fulfillment of God’s purpose for creation, where all things are reconciled in Christ (Colossians 1:20). Even habitual or prolonged resistance is ultimately overcome by God’s transformative grace, whether through purification, enlightenment, or relational persuasion.[](https://www.postost.net/2019/10/eschatological-horizons-david-bentley-harts-universalism)
4. **Critique of Dualistic Assumptions**: Rooney’s question assumes a libertarian view of freedom where humans can definitively reject God forever. Hart, Wood, and Sylvest would challenge this, arguing that freedom is not a neutral capacity but a rational orientation toward the Good. Sin is a misapprehension of the Good, not a permanent state of being.[](https://davenantinstitute.org/will-all-be-saved-david-bentley-hart-on-universal-salvation-reviewed-by-john-ehrett/)
They might collectively critique Rooney’s framework as overly reliant on a Thomistic or scholastic distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent wills, which they see as a theological construct that fails to capture the unity and simplicity of God’s love. Hart, in particular, has criticized such distinctions as “odd” and insufficient to explain why God’s desire for universal salvation would not be fulfilled. Wood might add that Maximus’s theology offers a more integrated view of divine providence, where all creaturely acts are subsumed into God’s redemptive plan. Sylvest could contribute a relational perspective, emphasizing that God’s providence works through persuasion rather than coercion, ensuring that no creature remains eternally resistant.[](https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2023/02/23/an-open-letter-to-fr-james-dominic-rooney/)
---
### **Addressing Rooney’s Specific Challenge**
Rooney’s question seeks a “principled difference” between the three scenarios of resistance. Universalists would likely argue that there is no principled difference in kind, only in degree, because all resistance is finite and temporal, whereas God’s love is infinite and eternal. The distinction between resisting once, habitually, or indefinitely is ultimately irrelevant because God’s will is not thwarted by creaturely defiance. The eschatological horizon, as Hart describes, involves a “full completion” where God is “all in all” (1 Corinthians 15:28), rendering eternal resistance impossible.[](https://www.postost.net/2019/10/eschatological-horizons-david-bentley-harts-universalism)
Rooney’s framework assumes that God’s permissive will could allow for eternal separation, but universalists would counter that such a permission would contradict God’s nature as the Good and the source of all being. If God permits sin, it is only to bring about a greater good, such as the free return of creatures to communion with Him. The possibility of indefinite resistance, therefore, is not a logical extension of God’s permissive will but a theological error that misrepresents divine providence.
---
### **Conclusion**
David Bentley Hart, Jordan Daniel Wood, and John Sobert Sylvest would respond to Fr. James Dominic Rooney’s question by rejecting the premise that God’s permissive will could allow for eternal resistance to His love. They would argue that all forms of resistance—whether a single act, habitual sin, or supposed indefinite defiance—are finite and cannot withstand the infinite, unconditional love of God. Drawing on scripture (e.g., 1 Timothy 2:4, 1 Corinthians 15:28), patristic theology (e.g., Maximus, Gregory of Nyssa), and metaphysical reasoning, they would affirm that God’s providence ensures the ultimate reconciliation of all creatures in the eschaton. Rooney’s distinction between God’s positive and permissive will, they would contend, fails to account for the unity and efficacy of divine love, which triumphs over all resistance to bring about the apokatastasis—the restoration of all things in Christ.[](https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2021/02/02/the-deep-patristic-roots-of-harts-universalism-a-response-to-fr-lawrence-farley/)
If you’d like me to expand on any specific aspect of their responses or provide further analysis of Rooney’s critique, let me know!
John Sobert Sylvest explores these questions in depth:
Introduction
(1) Balthasarian universalism: affirmation of both
predestinarianism and the universal salvific will,
(2) Augustinian & neo-Bañezian: affirmation of
predestinarianism and negation of the universal
salvific will,
(3) Maritainian: negation of predestinarianism and
affirmation of the universal salvific will;
(4) Molinism: negation of both predestinarianism and
the universal salvific will.
(5) Sylvestism: If we distinguish an apokatastenai
(restoration) in terms of a theophanic vision and an
apokatastasis in terms of a supratheophanic vision,
then my stance represents an –
a) affirmation of a predestinarian theophanic vision;
b) affirmation of the universal theophanic will;
c) negation of a predestinarian
supratheophanic vision; and
d) affirmation of the universal supratheophanic will.
Hence, I subscribe to an indicative apokatastenai &
subjunctive apokatastasis. I’m neither a perditionist
nor universalist but, rather, a Restorationist.
Regarding Proportionality Objections, perditionists ask
“Where is thy sting?” & universalists counter “Where is thy victory?”
From Cardinal Dulles’ remarks regarding Maritain’s
“Reverie,” which were reminiscent of Cardinal Newman’s evaluation of Mivart’s conjectures, we might infer that one could remain faithful to the Church’s eschatological doctrine — that it is necessarily possible that not all spiritual creatures will attain a supratheophanic vision — even while otherwise boldly speculating regarding what those creatures might otherwise experience – not just subjectively & psychologically vis a vis metrics of pain &/or felicity, but –objectively per alternative modes of divine union & mercy, each which gifts its own sort of rest & psychological satisfaction.
That’s to suggest that our interpretation of the essential doctrine needn’t necessarily entail an everlasting sting of remorse, much less an eternal conscious torment.
Going beyond, however, what either Dulles or Newman would’ve affirmed, not only might retributive sufferings be mercifully mitigated, need our interpretations of the essential doctrine entail any other perpetual psychological deficits — such as everlastingly unfulfilled longings, psychologically, or unattainable desires, teleologically?
All can attain successive states of rest, each state fully satisfying psychologically, in each sublative mode of divine union. This is because, prior to our being graced by their peculiar novel divine manifestations, each progressive state of rest (stability in the good) will remain hidden to us (what no eye’s seen, ear’s heard nor heart of woman conceived).
If this is true during our temporal theotic sojourn via the lights of experience, reason & faith, how much more so must this be true during our eternal epektasis via the lights of glory?
So, regarding any given creature’s lack of a supratheophanic vision, against the arguments of those who lob proportionality objections, following Dulles, Maritain, Newman & Mivart, here, one could reasonably ask of justice: “Where is thy sting?”
However, not all disproportionality objections are grounded in any per se unjust punishments, psychologically. Rather, they will instead lob protests at all unjust foreclosures on
any of the yet-to-have-been reduced infinite divine potencies of any spiritual creatures, teleologically. That’s because such absolute foreclosures would entail consequences that are prima facie disproportional to any sin a finite spiritual creature could commit.
Put differently, while one might indeed remain happily unaware of a generous inheritance that’s been intended for them, the injustice that would be committed against them by dispossessing them of same wouldn’t be obviated by the assertion that: “At least, they were robbed surreptitiously!”
Here, one could reasonably ask of justice: “Where is thy victory?”
Human beings are best conceived in terms of dynamical becomings in infinite potency to the divine. It’s not enough to simply assert that our lights of experience, reason & faith are modes of union with their own sorts of beatitude & rest vis a vis the same formal object, God. It’s not a natural – supernatural distinction that applies, here. Rather, it’s a relatively – absolutely perfect distinction between those modes & the light of glory.
For the dynamically becoming rational creature, then, these successive modes of operatively knowing God are sublative (Rahner’s not Hegel’s sublation). In short, to abort this intrinsic human dynamism would do violence to the human person, whom God loves for her own sake.
In my view, all that I discussed above can be distilled in one clarification, by answering one question: What’s the proper understanding of obediential potency?
My two favorite responses to that question are given by Lonergan & DBH. I commend two resources to all.
For a more technical threading of the Lubacian-Thomist needle, here’s a discussion of Lonergan’s account:
Why Mivart’s & Maritain’s views remain incoherent to me
It’s because all rational creatures are divinely presenced, constitutively & unalienably, and intrinsically desire the True, Beautiful & Good, Godself, that we rationally desire the knowledge of God reflected by creation’s shadows, vestiges, images & likenesses of Him.
That’s also why we’ll forever remain in infinite potency to growing our knowledge of God by manifold & multiform modes of union, some now inconceivable, as ordered toward an everlastingly deepening divine – human intimacy.
It is because we are finite & God is utterly incomprehensible that we’ll remain forever nescient & in infinite potency, so growing via epektasis.
It is precisely because we are forever nescient that –not only are our acts always essentially non necessitated, but – none of our rejections of truth, beauty & goodness could ever be total or definitive.
It Is because God owes it to Himself to be just that no disproportional consequences will ensue from the sins of finite rational creatures.
Therefore, even if Mivart is, in part, correct that rational creatures could experience, post-mortem, an original felicity
(which per my take would always have been essentially supernatural), his account remains incoherent. That’s because any everlasting foreclosure on a rational creature’s infinite potencies, whether of one’s substantial or accidental being, would entail consequences that are disproportional to any sin a finite rational creature could commit.
Whose Libertarianism? Which Terminus? What’s Transcendentally Determined?
It seems that some would want to hold that it necessarily remains metaphysically possible that a rational creature could, indefinitely, willfully disregard its knowledge of God and that one could, therefore, be fully responsible & sufficiently culpable for persisting in any sinful rejections of God. One could thereby indefinitely resist ever becoming practically impeccable.
While I’m not unsympathetic to the notion that finite creatures remain essentially peccable, that fact, alone, couldn’t entail perditionism. A rational creature could well remain fully responsible for disregarding its knowledge of God when acting and be sufficiently culpable for persisting in its vicious habits.
Without an exhaustive knowledge of God, however, no rational creature could ever be absolutely culpable.
At the same time, in order for rational creatures to finally attain a stability in the good (practical impeccability) & enjoy an essential beatitude, it’s not metaphysically necessary for
them to (& so need not have been transcendentally determined that they’ll) have reduced every divine potency
to act or come to possess an exhaustive knowledge of God.
Under this scenario, in my view, what will have been transcendentally determined is every rational creature’s stability in the good or practical impeccability.
That each rational creature will reach a stability in the good remains a divinely determined given. How each creature traverses that path would be accomplished in a graced self determined way per each one’s own relatively autonomous soul-crafting deliberations.
So, we can stipulate, even if just for argument’s sake, that not every divine potency will have to have passed to act before a rational creature could enjoy an essential beatitude & stability in the good, perhaps even being sufficiently satisfied, psychologically. After all, that seems to be entailed by the dynamics of an everlasting epektasis?
At the same time, the reality of any psychological satisfaction, alone, could not overcome the disproportionality objection we’ve lobbed against any unjust foreclosure on a rational creature’s yet-to-have-been reduced infinite divine potencies. Such an absolute foreclosure would entail consequences that are disproportional to any sin a finite rational creature could commit.
A question might beg, then, regarding any rational creatures who’ve deliberately remained intractably intransigent, as to how they might be brought to a stability in the good in a manner not repugnant to their essential autonomy & freedom. Given a proper understanding of a sufficiently rational freedom & divine gratuity of grace, such persons can be miraculously & efficaciously graced, infallibly & providentially, which is to say per a gratuitous & relatively exceptional divine terminus ad quem of all moral vice.
Per my own libertarian inclinations, it has not otherwise been transcendentally determined that every divine potency will of necessity pass to act by efficacious, if not sufficient, gracings. Some such reductions to act, e.g. supererogatory, shall remain everlastingly exclusively self-determined, unless otherwise exceptionally & divinely predestined. This is to suggest that no particular divine terminus ad quem of one’s moral vices necessarily will entail any terminus a quo of supererogation, for it’s not just how each will pursue divine intimacy that’s generally subject to our autonomous soul -crafting but, also, how much.
“Even more happiness in hell” is not remotely enough
CONTRA Lembke M. Even more happiness in hell.
Religious Studies. Published online 2024:1-16.
Doi:10.1017/S0034412524000404
I reply:
Even if “infinity in itself does nothing to establish a retributive disproportionality between a punishment and an offence (Lembke)” and even if modes of union with God other than the supratheophanic might be eschatologically realizable, there is no universe wherein comprehensive everlasting foreclosures on potential advances in degrees of interpersonal intimacy would not be considered unjustly harsh tragedies (cf. the timeless expression of this most poignantly painful experience of human passion in the story of the Capulets & Montagues).
In the end, Lembke’s argument beats the same hasty retreat taken by all other perditionist apologists, i.e. with authoritarian & mysterian appeals to doctrine, this one in the form of the so-called “soteriological axiom.”
Discussion
Suppose the punishment of hell would consist in someone’s being denied dessert after dinner once every 10,000 years. The trivial fact that this punishment would be ‘infinite’ (in some strained sense) obviously does not entail that it would be unjustly harsh. Hence infinity in itself does nothing to
establish a retributive disproportionality between a punishment and an offence.”
Robert F. wrote: “As it is without ending, it is unjust for it befits not a finite transgression. As it is without ending I cannot see how it wouldn’t be cruel, as it is without purpose. How could it be remedial, redemptive?”
Yes! And as I think back to your objection to the DOA conception of “blissful ignorance,” it occurs to me that Lembke failed to mention that it’s only glucose that the damned are enjoying for dinner each day and that it’s being served intravenously via a saline solution.
I say this because human beings are best conceived in terms of dynamical becomings in infinite potency to the divine.
It’s not enough to simply assert that our lights of experience, reason & faith are modes of union with their own sorts of beatitude & rest vis a vis the same formal object, God. It’s not a natural – supernatural distinction that applies, here. Rather, it’s a relatively – absolutely perfect distinction between those modes & the light of glory. For the dynamically becoming rational creature, then, these successive modes of operatively knowing God are sublative (Rahner’s not Hegel’s sublation). In short, to abort this
intrinsic human dynamism is to do violence to the human person, whom God loves for her own sake.
Father Al registered his principal objection to the relativity model, that it depends upon an understanding of human nature that doesn’t naturally desire deification in Christ:
“Specifically, it depends upon a second millennium scholastic tradition (natura pura) that departs from the reachings of the Eastern and Western Fathers. Father Al further noted that Lembke’s appeal to psychological dynamics requires grounding in a theological anthropology.
And he cited Randall Rosenberg’s _The Givenness of Desire (2017)_.
That’s THE theo-rub in a nutshell!
In my view, all that I discussed above can be distilled in one clarification, by answering one question: What’s the proper understanding of obediential potency?
My two favorite responses to that question are given by Lonergan & DBH. I commend two resources to all.
For a more technical threading of the Lubacian-Thomist needle, here’s a discussion of Lonergan’s account (here’s 1 chapter of Rosenberg, Fr. Al!).
Concretely Operating Nature: Lonergan on the Natural Desire to See God” is a chapter in the book The Givenness of Desire by Randall S. Rosenberg. The chapter examines the human desire for God through the lens of Lonergan’s “concrete subjectivity”.
That chapter is available at Muse and not behind a paywall.
https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/50/oa_monograph/chapter/3320774
For a most entertaining & informative discussion of obediential potency as properly conceived, on Apr 17, 2022
David Bentley Hart published an open letter on his substack – “Edward Feser’s Sub-Christian Dualism”
It’s not behind a paywall.
https://davidbentleyhart.substack.com/p/edward-fesers sub-christian-dualism
Not all practical impeccabilities or stabilities in the good are the same. Each person’s stability in the good for any particular mode of union has been attained by a blend of intrinsic & extrinsic factors. Generally, the more one’s impeccability has been attained pursuant to intrinsic factors, the greater will be one’s degree of virtue & capacity for beatitude. Our original epistemic distancing, which requires the light of faith and a life of trust presumably provides each the most optimal extrinsic environment to grow in virtue per intrinsic self-determinations. The more people who come to various modes of divine union via graced intrinsic self-determinations the better, for their own sakes.
The greater, too, will be the People of God’s overall degrees of virtue & capacities for beatitude, ad majorem Dei gloriam.
To the extent, then, that there would be ongoing post mortem second chances, it would seem to me that one’s extrinsic environment would necessarily play a much larger role in one’s attainment of a practical impeccability, thus decreasing the opportunities for contributions by one’s intrinsic self-determinations, hence the degrees of virtue & capacities for beatitude which are attainable post-mortem.
God’s permission of sin is ordered to the optimal attainment of personal & ecclesial virtue, beatitude & unitive intimacy. No permission of damnation is necessary for either these optimal ante-mortem attainments of sanctity (maximally intrinsic) or suboptimal post-mortem attainments (variously extrinsic).
No Despair in Heaven
I prepared this essay, below, for future dialogues with various A.I. chatbots.
I offer it to introduce certain nuances, especially modal distinctions, that I feel are being habitually elided in much of the current eschatological discourse.
Consider the stances articulated below, by Dr Sullivan, the Rev. Dr. Rooney & John Sobert Sylvest. Those stances variously address the natures of the God-World relationship, divine sovereignty, human freedom and various problems of evil.
This is John Sylvest submitting this query even though I refer to myself in the third person hereinbelow.
It appears that all three authors are committed to a moderately libertarian understanding of human freedom, moderately compatibilist in the sense that all human potencies, both essential & accidental have been divinely determined, while libertarian in the sense that the reductions of any accidental potencies, including the obediential, remain always non-necessitated (contra conventional notions of irresistable grace).
It appears, too, that all three authors would stipulate that there’s nothing about created persons that makes it becessary that they love God and achieve union to the same degree or know God in all the same modes or to the same extent.
It would seem to follow from the above stipulations that these agreements regarding non-necessitation transcend any possible disagreements that might arise regarding the nature of the soul. That’s to suggest that no post-mortem implications as might be entailed from variously conceiving the soul, for example, per either a universal hylomorphism (pneumatic) or nuanced survivalist hylomorphism, would obviate the above agreed upon stipulations even if they could introduce other problematics.
It would seem to necessarily follow that, consistent with Maritain, the stances above could possibly entail that even the angels were peccable, and consistent with Scotus, that angels are intrinsically mutable. This would seem to implicate a spiritual materialism and a denial of post mortem fixity. It would leave open, however, questions regarding the nature of any extrinsic conditions as could or not present for the will’s deliberation. For example, post mortem, a practical impeccability could thus obtain, this notwithstanding anyone’s habitual dispositions, i.e. whether virtuous or vicious and to what degree.
But it’s precisely matters of degree as modal distinctions that might come into play in drawing salient distinctions between these authors’ stances, despite the important agreements hereinabove.
Specifically, if all created rational beings are essentially fallible, finite, epistemically distanced, nescient, relatively impeccable & morally perfectible, then, while there may indeed be all manner of series of actions, a human person could freely perform, in an informed state in the absence of relevant non-culpable ignorance, it does not follow, whatsoever, that there could not, in principle, be an ineluctable, relevant non-culpable ignorance that would necessarily be in play for certain putative actions, which could not, therefore, be performed in a sufficiently free manner.
The abiding human nescience that provisions the freedom of our non-necessitated acts precisely derives from our relative perfections, which are in infinite potency to divine absolute perfections. It’s that very dynamism of becoming that’s operating in all human development, maturation, spiritual formation, theosis & epektasis. But those relative perfections are heavily freighted with theoanthropological implications that require modal distinctions whenever we refer to human acts of will & understanding. The obvious implications include our only ever being relatively perfect, relatively knowledgeable and so relatively culpable vis a vis putative absolute rejections of grace, even though, quite obviously, we can be sufficiently knowledgeable & culpable vis a vis relative rejections of grace.
While we could, in principle, persist indefinitely in such relative rejections, the notion that there could even be such a thing as a putative free absolute rejection of God is incoherent. That’s precisely because one would subvert the very nescience, which underwrites our free deliberative choosing in the first place, if one presupposed — what would be tantamount to — an absolute knowledge of God.
The divine essence’s whatness, in quidditative terms, remains supremely intelligible precisely because it will remain abysally (not abysmally) unfathomable, even for those who will otherwise, via the divine – human noetic identity, comprehensively experience its thatness, beatifically.
None of this would entail that a “perfectly loving, omnipotent, and good God cannot allow moral evil to obtain,” it only means that a relatively loving, relatively knowledgeable & relatively perfect creature cannot commit a perfectly immoral evil act.
None of this would entail that it is conceivable that “a rational creature, endowed with free will, couldn’t reject God’s offer of love and mercy forever, and never turn back,” only that one could never absolutely & “perfectly” reject God.
While “there is no logical contradiction” in the statement that “someone could reject God forever,” such statements elide such indispensable modal distinctions, as totally, completely, wholly, absolutely, perfectly, ad infinitum, thus are – not only empirically falsifiable, but – analytically false based on the definitions that pertain to all finite rational beings.
While we could “be responsible ‘enough’ for each sin” and we could “be responsible ‘enough’ for persisting in sin (at any time we do so),” it does not follow that applying modal distinctions to those statements would be unprincipled. We could also aver that, because we could never be responsible enough for absolute & definitive rejections of God, we could never be responsible enough for persisting in absolute & definitive rejections of God.
All three authors stipulate that there’s nothing about created persons that makes it necessary that they love God and achieve union to the same degree or know God in all the same modes or to the same extent, and that further entails that “God is not promoting each person’s welfare as much as He could, it would be unreasonable to hold God blameworthy simply for failing to promote welfare 'maximally,’ as God could literally always do more.”
Allowing self-determined degrees of divine intimacy is not to allow persons to “put themselves in a position where they experience negatively infinite disvalue or cease to be able to enjoy any good whatsoever, but to achieve less good than they could have achieved.”
However, would it not be reasonable to hold God blameworthy should He fail to sustain anyone’s welfare ‘minimally’? Would it not be reasonable to hold God blameworthy should He allow consequences to follow from acts & dispositions in ways that are prima facie disproportional to any sin a finite spiritual creature could commit? For example, ECT (eternal conscious torment)?
I explore in greater detail which types & degrees of consequences might reasonably be defended as proportional or justifiably assailed as disproportional here.
https://theologoumenon.substack.com/about
Dr Scott M. Sullivan wrote on X (fka Twitter):
It is true that the Church teaches that eternal damnation is possible. But what sort of possibility is required? What are the minimal requirements for belief here?
At minimum, the doctrine demands only that damnation is logically possible: that it is conceivable that a rational creature, endowed with free will, could reject God’s offer of love and mercy forever, and never turn back.
That’s it.
The Church does not require us to believe that any such rejection has occurred, will occur, or is even likely to occur.
Only that, in principle, a created will could forever refuse communion with God. This is a statement about theoretical freedom not a metaphysical prediction.
But a logical possibility is not the same as an actual outcome. It’s logically possible that everyone will be saved just as it’s logically possible that someone won’t be. Catholic universalism affirms the former as a real hope, and denies nothing essential to the faith in doing so.
This minimal sense of “possibility” allows the Church to warn against hell without presuming to know who—if anyone will go there. And it allows the faithful to hope, pray, and even reasonably believe that God’s grace will ultimately prevail over every heart.
In other words:
Yes, someone could reject God forever. There is no logical contradiction in that statement.
But whether anyone will is a separate question, one left open by the Church.
Therefore, the hope, or even the confidence (which is my view) that all will be saved remains fully Catholic.
Fr James Dominic Rooney, in his book, _ No Hope in
Hell_ wrote:
As with compatibilists generally, universalists often respond by drawing a distinction between doing evil fully freely (which is supposedly impossible) and being responsible for evil done. Analogies on which humans are akin to children, incapable of being responsible enough to merit damnation, aver to a distinction between the way in which we do not perform actions with ‘full freedom’ but that it is nevertheless appropriate to hold us responsible for the consequences of our action in some contexts.Such distinctions nevertheless seem to be unprincipled: if we can be responsible ‘enough’ for each sin, we can be responsible ‘enough’ for persisting in sin (at any time we do so).
There are theological problems too. The overall conclusion these universalist arguments aim to establish is that “…there is no action, and no series of actions, a human person can freely perform, in an informed state in the absence of relevant non-culpable ignorance, to merit ending up in hell.” Union with God is supposed to be such that it can only occur in such a way that we would be unable to reject it. If God has made salvation available to everyone, then this would entail that each person will necessarily come to love God and achieve union with Him. Otherwise, God would not have made salvation appropriately available to everyone. Thus, the universalist implicitly alleges a contradiction in the view that anyone culpably rejects salvation: if a person is ever capable of loving God, this requires being in circumstances such as to be relevantly responsible and free in choosing to love God, and those relevant circumstances will involve knowledge that makes it impossible to fail to love God.30 Ekstrom thus finds it incomprehensible how anyone “could truly encounter God, in all God’s glory, greatness, pure goodness, and radiant love, and yet freely choose to view God as repulsive. If one has genuinely encountered God…the attraction of the most attractive, glorious, unsurpassable being is irresistible.” Yet many theists think this sort of encounter with God is what constitutes salvation rather than a prerequisite for forming a relationship with God. It is not apparent why one would be incapable of freely forming a relationship with God without this kind of irresistible experience. Clearly, we do not need God to be present to us irresistibly to sin. But damnation is simply persisting in a state of sin. Conversely, if it is possible for an individual to stop loving God – even temporarily – that person ceases to be in an appropriate state for union with God at any time in the future, as long as they fail to repent and change their attitudes. So, if we can sin without having an Irresistible experience, we can go to hell without one. And, if all failures to form a relationship with God (every act of sin) result from God culpably failing to provide us with sufficiently irresistible experiences to prevent those sins, then every sin we commit would be logically incompatible with God’s essential goodness, love, and omnipotence. But as these arguments imply a perfectly loving, omnipotent, and good God cannot allow moral evil to obtain, they are arguments for atheism, not universalism, as moral evil obviously obtains.
John Sobert Sylvest writes:
Human Nature is Relatively Impeccable & Peccability is an unavoidable incidental not an intended essential property
This musing is a follow to:
Dear ChatBot: If epistemic distance is necessary for freedom, then why does epistemic closure enhance freedom?
And also to:
Is Reality Brute, Fruit, Mute? Reenchanting Reality with a confident assurance in things hoped for & conviction of things unseen!
And, in some ways, in conversation with:
The Epistemic Principle of Sufficient Reason (E-PSR): A Transcendentally Necessary and Abductively Confirmed Foundation of Rational Inquiry
I pushed back on 2 different ChatBots today. While they “came around,” I find they have a tendency to go along to get along. I’m still confident in my proposal, though.
Considering peccability as an essential potency seems incoherent. How could we reflect the divine nature as an image of God? How does the hypostatic union reconcile the peccability of Christ’s human nature with His divine nature?
Is there a better way to define peccability that might make it
more harmonious with or better cohere with the conception of human nature as a divine image?
Because our human relative perfections remain in infinite potency to divine absolute perfections and because our epistemic distancing, fallibility & nescience are ordered to toward a freedom for excellence, naturally, we are relatively impeccable (which partly entails not ever being absolutely culpable! But that’s another argument).
It’s therefore more apt to say that we are morally perfectible, essentially, rather than to say that we’re simply peccable. That way, the moral perfectibility of Jesus’ human nature could be totally harmonious with His perfect divine nature. That way, the relative impeccability of human persons better coheres with our being divine images. Jesus "simply” already was what we are to forever be about becoming. *** note below
While that relative impeccability can be coopted & perverted into its parasitic subcontrary, i.e. a so-called peccability, that habitual tendency, which can be situated in between our infinite potencies to an absolute divine impeccability & their reductions by our relatively impeccable finite acts, can only ever hinder those reductions but can neither ever obliterate those potencies nor our intrinsic & unalienable personal capacity to reduce them.
Peccability per se might then better be understood as only anthropologically incidental & metaphysically unavoidable as opposed to any divinely intended essential potency, which is to recognize that it was permitted but only because it remains utterly remediable and for the sake of higher goods.
So, per our primary nature, we are — not only epistemically open (distanced), fallible & nescient, but — relatively impeccable & morally perfectible. And that describes our substantial being protologically, historically & eschatologically. And that accounts for our maturation, theosis & epektasis, as always before, so now & ever more.
Because peccability is not essential, only incidental, and only a parasitic subcontrary, it presents no conceptual incompatibilities between divine & human natures, which are totally harmonious. Those natures are otherwise
juxtaposed in terms of absolute & relative impeccability, in/finite, non/composite, in/fallible ad in/finitum.
Therefore - Human nature is relatively impeccable & peccability is an unavoidable incidental not an intended essential property.
Put differently, we do need to be able to make mistakes & to learn from them as part as our soul-crafting sojourn. We don’t need to be “able” to persist in our refusals to learn from them. And we especially don’t need the “ability” to definitively & absolutely refuse to cooperate with grace or reject God. If we do need a capacity to refuse grace & say no, and arguably we do, it can’t be from some putative absolute or perfect peccability.
Because we DO always have the ability “not to sin,” whether venially or gravely, and we do NOT ever have the capacity to exhaustively & finally reject God, definitively, that makes us relatively impeccable and not a whit, jot nor tittle absolutely peccable. A pushback that this could also entail being relatively peccable simply reifies peccability, for to Whose Peccability would we be related? If peccability were essential to being human (like if physical mortality was essential to being human), then why are we impeccable post-mortem (like physically immortal post-mortem). I suspect that we do have an ability to refuse divine invites to supererogation, but that’s not peccability.
While the possibility of peccability as an incidental state is anthropologicaly unavoidable, metaphysically necessary & divinely intended, it’s not a natural property or reducible potency of either our substantial or accidental being.
Divine Responsibility Without Culpability: A Response to James Dominic Rooney’s Critique of David Bentley Hart
James Dominic Rooney critiques David Bentley Hart for rejecting the Thomistic distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent will, arguing that this rejection undermines the ability to maintain God’s goodness in the face of evil. According to Rooney, without such metaphysical tools, one risks attributing either too much causal responsibility to God for evil or failing to reconcile divine providence with the reality of suffering (Rooney, 2022).
However, a deeper examination of Hart’s position reveals that his approach does not, in fact, compromise divine goodness but rather preserves it in a manner more consistent with the implications of creatio ex nihilo. In traditional Thomistic theology, the antecedent will refers to
what God wills in itself (e.g., the salvation of all), while the consequent will refers to what God wills in light of contingent circumstances (e.g., permitting damnation due to free will). This framework is intended to maintain a moral distance between God’s willing and the existence of evil (Aquinas, ST I.19.6).
Yet under the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, all that exists —including the conditions that make evil possible — ultimately originates in God’s will. To say God merely “permits” evil fails to relieve Him of metaphysical responsibility. The mere possibility of moral evil is not an accident of creation but an unavoidable consequence of willing into existence free, rational agents. Therefore, God remains metaphysically implicated in all that ensues (Hart, The Doors of the Sea, 2005).
Nonetheless, this metaphysical responsibility need not entail moral culpability. An analogy with the principle of double effect is instructive here: God foresees the potential for evil as a side effect of creating creatures capable of love, reason, and freedom. He does not will evil directly, nor does He use it as a means to achieve some greater good. Moral evil, in this framework, serves no necessary or instrumental role in God’s plan for creation (Hart, That All Shall Be Saved, 2019).
Gart’s view holds that while God permits evil, He has no purpose for it, no need of it, and does not integrate it into His divine economy as a tool. Instead, evil is an aberration — a parasitic distortion of the good — which God will ultimately defeat and redeem in the eschaton. Thus, divine goodness is upheld not by metaphysical distinctions that attempt to sanitize God’s will, but by an uncompromising moral vision that refuses to see evil as necessary or beneficial (Hart, The Doors of the Sea, 2005).
In this light, Rooney’s Thomistic concerns, while metaphysically elegant, are insufficient to account for the moral intuition that evil cannot be part of God’s plan.
Hart’s refusal to instrumentalize evil, coupled with a robust
eschatology and a clear articulation of God’s metaphysical responsibility without moral culpability, offers a more theologically satisfying and morally coherent theodicy.
Therefore, the charge that Hart’s position worsens the problem of evil fails to recognize the depth and nuance of his response. By acknowledging the full implications of divine creation and upholding a radical rejection of evil’s necessity, Hart not only preserves but amplifies the moral seriousness with which Christian theology must confront suffering and evil in the world.
References
• Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae. Translated by the
Fathers of the English Dominican Province.
• Hart, David Bentley. The Doors of the Sea: Where Was
God in the Tsunami? Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.,
2005.
• Hart, David Bentley. That All Shall Be Saved: Heaven,
Hell, and Universal Salvation. Yale University Press, 2019.
• Rooney, James Dominic. “On Evil and the Will of God.”
Nova et Vetera (2022).
Not a Hope in Hell by Fr Rooney – where I resonate & where I struggle
I am pleased to see that Fr Al at Eclectic Orthodoxy has introduced Fr Rooney Discusses Not a Hope in Hell.
I had previously engaged _Not a Hope in Hell_ because I liked its phraseology & it helped me to deepen my own self -understanding. So, I published the following, which was not a review:
A Foil to my Universal Restoration: Not a Hope in Hell by James Dominic Rooney
I did at the time keep notes wherein I identified what I thought were the book’s most helpful points as well as those I had a hard time following.
The following musings, aided by AI, set forth what I saw as the book’s strengths:
Overall, the book demonstrates the intricate relationship between God’s permission of sin and the problem of evil. It posits that understanding God’s allowance of sin is crucial for addressing the problem of moral evil. It attempts to reconcile God’s providential control with human free will in a way that avoids making Him the necessary author of sin, i.e. without Him being its direct cause.
It defends God’s benevolence, asserting that God’s unconditional love for persons is the fundamental reason behind His permission of sin. It addresses the problem of evil by placing the emphasis on God’s love and the importance of free will. It demonstrates that the permission of sin and the problem of evil are inseparable, and that any attempt to resolve the latter must grapple with the former.
In approaching the relationship between the permission of sin and the problem of evil through the lens of God’s providence and human free will, it argues that the "permission of sin” involves God allowing moral evils (sin) to occur, rather than directly causing them. It shows how this aligns with the broader “problem of evil,” which questions how an all-good, all-powerful God can permit evil to exist by highlighting that God’s permission of sin respects human free will—an essential component of moral agency—while simultaneously serving His ultimate plan of goodness. It thus suggests that God’s permitting sin isn’t arbitrary but is instrumental in His providential governance of the world.
Even though God doesn’t will evil, He may allow it as a way
to bring about greater goods, like the development of virtues or the revelation of His justice and mercy. This reasoning emphasizes that the permission of sin and the problem of evil are intricately linked through the interplay of divine wisdom, human freedom, and the ultimate purpose of creation.
God’s providence thus governs the world in such a way that everything, including moral evil, is permitted for a greater
purpose while never willing sin directly but only ever allowing it as part of His overarching plan for creation.
Since human freedom is essential for moral agency, if God prevented all moral evil, human beings would lack true freedom, thereby undermining the possibility of virtue, moral responsibility, and genuine love.
Because the book frames the permission of sin as a subset of this broader issue—God allows moral evils (sins) because they contribute to His providential governance, it aligns with classical theodicies, which argue that God permits evil to bring about greater goods. It makes the point that, while sin is a moral evil, its permission is not arbitrary—because it serves a purpose in God’s divine wisdom. As a specific case within the problem of evil, the permission of sin entails that, if God allows any evil (including sin), He must have a morally sufficient reason.
The book’s explanation hinges on free will and divine wisdom, showing that the two concepts are inseparably linked. Its reasoning suggests that the existence of moral evil (sin) is not evidence against God’s goodness but rather a necessary consequence of creating free creatures who are capable of love, virtue, and moral responsibility.
A coherent concept of sin thus entails that humans with sufficient knowledge and sufficient consent can be sufficiently responsible for moral evil, so can with sufficient freedom violate a sufficiently formed conscience by rejecting the moral laws implanted in all hearts (generally revealed) and even the love of God (specially revealed).
The book’s conception of freedom is consistent with the view that grace is nonnecessitating, that our intellect & will are inseparably operative in volition, that freedom’s not innate to the will but only ever the fruit of the will & the mind in collaboration, i.e. deliberatively. While grace would not, therefore, “irresistibly” secure our consent, this is not to deny that our consent could otherwise be both efficaciously secured & deliberatively delivered, providentially & infallibly.
The following musings focus on what appeared to me arguments that, because they generally elided modal distinctions of one type or another that I consider indispensable, were not at all compelling.
A question might thus beg regarding why God doesn’t thus providentially & infallibly secure our eventual cooperation with grace. The book makes the point that God could indeed prevent each sinful act from occurring, whether providentially & infallibly or by justifying anyone in sin at any moment, but that this is not “to grant that God harms someone by allowing them to persist in sin” as that “would imply that God harms people every time anyone sins or persists in sin.”
While on the surface this might seem true, it elides the indispensable nuances that might better be conveyed by temporal modalities. Could there not be meaningful differences between persisting transiently versus everlastingly?
Similary, by eliding such modal distinctions as would be indispensable to distinguish realities that are variously finite or infinite, that are variously absolute or relative, that present in degrees rather than in terms of all or nothing and either – or, we risk drawing facile conclusions from arguments that, however valid logically, fail to successfully reference reality.
Specifically, because divine & human persons differ in being simple versus composite, variously non/determinate & in/finite, with absolute versus relative perfections, syllogistic arguments that elide such distinctions will be modally fallacious. Because human persons are relatively — not completely —knowledgeable regarding general & special revelations, they can only ever be considered relatively — not absolutely — free in their deliberations regarding atemporal & eternal realities, including beings, entities, acts, relations and consequences, and so can only ever be considered relatively —not fully —responsible for rejecting God.
This means that a coherent concept of sin, would also entail that, while humans can with sufficient knowledge and sufficient consent be sufficiently responsible for some moral evils, humans don’t have sufficient knowledge of Truth, Himself, such that they could freely & willingly consent to a complete, final & definitive rejection of Goodness, Himself.
Accordingly, in line with the relevant meaningful modal distinctions, legitimate proportionality objections will obtain whenever claims are made that human moral evils are to be remedied with what are prima facie disproportional —hence unjust — consequences.
At this juncture, disquistions regarding putative possible good arguments are inapposite as the reality of anyone’s putative suffering such prima facie disproportional consequences would not arise as the consequence of a free choice counterfactual, in the first place, since one’s interlocutors are not even stipulating to such consequences as being possible world counterfactuals.
However, might those interlocutors be pumping false intuitions?
Well, according to most people’s shared parental instincts, moral insights, aesthetic sensibilities and common sense, Eternal Conscious Torment should strike them as parentally abhorrent, morally unintelligible, aesthetically repugnant, nonsensically absurd, performatively contradictory, disproportionally consequential & anthropologically incoherent.
But who’s to say that these evaluative dispositions are divine connatural inclinations and not, rather, false intuitions about perfect love, however appealing or emotionally attractive they might otherwise appear when initially stated?
As long as one can invoke a mysterian appeal that
Even if it doesn’t surpass our fondest parental hopes, aesthetic sensibilities & moral insights with an unimaginable weight of eternal glories building on those dispositions, and even if it does overturn them by enshrining what’s parentally alien, aesthetically repugnant & morally unintelligible, which is to say in a way that’s absolutely foreign to what we’d truly believed had been implanted in our hearts —
Invokes some putative greater good (for how high His Ways are above our own!), then they’re not a thoroughgoing voluntarist, theoretically.
They could, however, be reasonably considered a virtual voluntarist, practically?