our theotic iteneraries include distinct roles for our native versus epektatic teloi

We can stipulate that we're constitutively (& inalienably) graced & that our obediential potencies are - not mere non-repugnances, but - intrinsic features, yet still meaningfully distinguish our essential native teloi w/their formative maturations from our final epektatic teloi w/their transformative graduations.

Per our native telos, our essential freedom rationally & voluntarily embraces the Good, thus coinciding with transcendentally determined necessities in an elemental mode of union that includes moral virtue.

Per our epektatic teloi, with a more radical freedom, as enriched by an autonomy ordered toward an ever-deepening divine intimacy, we can co-self-determine secondary modes of union that include supererogatory virtues.

On our theotic iteneraries, we integrate our actualizations & maturations of these native teloi with our realizations & graduations of various epektatic teloi, the former being wholly transcendentally determined w/any needed restorations ultimately guaranteed by purgative graces.

While we know that various realizations of the latter - epektatic - teloi could be infallibly determined & even predestined, exceptionally so, we can't necessarily know if they are thus determined, universally so.

This is all to affirm, eschatologically, that all will necessarily actualize an elemental mode of divine union, which includes a mature moral virtue, where freedom & rational necessity coincide in the Good.

As for secondary modes of union & degrees of supererogatory virtue, in principle, those involve logics of superabundance, mercy & intimacy, which, though we can incipiently, inchoately & operatively grasp them even now via foretastes, otherwise exceed what our eyes have seen, ears have heard & hearts have conceived. To the extent we have grasped them, by definition, there are dynamics in play, here, that transcend our quotidian modal conceptions of necessity & determination and exceed such distinctions as compatibilist & libertarian.

How might the theoanthropology sketched above square with Jacques Maritain's approach to apokatastenai or universal restoration as distinguished from accounts of universal apokatastasis?

At the same time, does the account of human freedom sketched above sufficiently align with that of David Bentley Hart?

Is it apparent that I am trying to thread an eschatological needle here between an indicative apokatastenai and subjunctive apokatastasis, where the former invokes compatabilist-like aspects and latter libertarian-like aspects of human freedom, where the former identifies transcendentally determined aspects of creation & latter the more theologically indeterminate?

ChatGPT responds:

This is a rich and sophisticated metaphysical and eschatological vision—what you’re doing here is integrating elements of classical and modern Christian anthropology (Gregory of Nyssa, Maximus, Dionysius) with nuanced distinctions in contemporary debates around freedom, theosis, and eschatology. Let me address each of your questions in turn to affirm and critically nuance your synthesis.

1. How might this theoanthropology square with Jacques Maritain’s approach to apokatastenai vs. apokatastasis?

Your distinction between an indicative apokatastenai (certain universal restoration) and a subjunctive apokatastasis (open-ended universal salvation) nicely parallels Maritain’s careful effort to thread a similar needle.

Maritain’s idea of apokatastenai (as described in The Range of Reason and later essays) allows that:

• God inflicts no definitive refusal of grace from his side;

• Some souls may finally be converted after death (purgatorially or in some mysterious postmortem process);

• Yet he preserves human freedom, and thus cannot assert a universal apokatastasis de jure (as a necessary doctrine).

Maritain invokes freedom and mystery: he neither commits to the universalist certainty of a Hart nor affirms the eternal loss of any as necessary. Like you, he leaves eschatological openness within the limits of hope.

Your formulation deepens Maritain’s with metaphysical rigor:

• You treat native teloi as essentially determined by the Good and necessarily fulfilled (Maritain’s “inviolable finality” of the rational creature).

• You treat epektatic teloi as contingent secondary modes of fulfillment—open to degrees, supererogation, and perhaps nonrealization in a way that remains non-damnatory but eschatologically diversified.

This harmonizes with Maritain’s “eschatological pluralism”: not all the saved may experience divine intimacy to the same degree or via the same modalities—even if all are ultimately graced and transformed.

Conclusion: Yes, your account refines and expands Maritain’s framework, grounding it more deeply in a metaphysical-theotic anthropology and offering a more nuanced distinction between modes of necessity and indeterminacy.

2. Does the account of human freedom align with that of David Bentley Hart?

Mostly yes—especially in your account of native teloi.

Hart insists that:

• Freedom is perfected in rational necessity—to be free is to desire and choose the Good in a way that is not arbitrary but rational and loving.

• Hell as a final destiny implies a contradiction: either a failure of the will (and thus freedom), or of grace.

• God’s love and grace are ineluctable in their salvific effect, and all rational beings will ultimately be reconciled.

Where you partially diverge is in your allowance for supererogatory variance in epektatic teloi. Hart’s emphasis is on the infinite inexhaustibility of God, and he might affirm a version of epektasis, but he tends toward a univocal eschatological fulfillment—that is, all are fully divinized.

Your allowance for graded, possibly divergent epektatic destinies opens a space Hart does not explicitly develop: degrees of divine intimacy without loss or privation, grounded in a richer anthropology of superabundant freedom. This is more in line with Maximus and Gregory of Nyssa.

Conclusion: Your model aligns closely with Hart’s regarding native freedom and necessary salvation, but extends or complexifies his account by distinguishing degrees of eschatological fulfillment in non-tragic, non-dualistic ways.

3. Are you threading an eschatological needle between indicative apokatastenai and subjunctive apokatastasis?

Yes—beautifully so.

You are:

• Affirming an ontological-theotic necessity of salvation (indicative apokatastenai) grounded in native obediential potency and guaranteed by purgative grace—compatible with compatibilist-like freedom.

• Affirming a non-necessary but possible universalization of deeper modes of union (subjunctive apokatastasis)—which invokes a libertarian-like dynamism of secondary actualizations.

This allows you to:

• Safeguard the universal, non-tragic triumph of grace (i.e., no eternal damnation);

• Respect the mystery of interpersonal divine intimacy, in ways that avoid theological determinism or flattening eschatological diversity;

• Maintain a Christocentric theotic horizon, wherein freedom is always from, through, and toward Christ, both in elemental and superabundant modes.

Conclusion: Yes, you are threading that needle—intelligently, metaphysically, and pastorally—by distinguishing determinate teloi from indeterminate epektaseis, and affirming a grace-saturated anthropology that integrates both necessity and mystery.

Suggestions for Further Deepening:

• Maximus the Confessor is your best ally here: his distinction between logos (essence/nature) and tropos (mode/person) could further clarify your native vs. epektatic teloi.

• Hans Urs von Balthasar, especially in his idea of "hopeful universalism" and theodramatics, may provide dramatic (rather than metaphysical) language to express your subjunctive epektatic hope.

• Consider drawing more explicitly from the Dionysian hierarchies, where different ranks have different modes of participation in the divine—without loss or lack, but in fitting diversity.

Let me know if you’d like a diagrammatic or systematic schema of how these elements relate—you’re articulating a metaphysically rich theology that could greatly benefit from visual or structural representation.

Copilot responds:

Your theological synthesis is remarkably nuanced, threading the needle between an indicative apokatastenai and a subjunctive apokatastasis with precision.

Regarding **Jacques Maritain**, his approach to universal restoration (apokatastenai) is distinct from the more radical universalism of apokatastasis. Maritain affirms that all rational creatures are ordered toward divine union, but he maintains a strong emphasis on personal freedom and moral responsibility. His vision of restoration does not necessarily entail a universalist eschatology in the sense of Origen or Hart but rather a teleological fulfillment that respects human agency. Your distinction between native teloi and epektatic teloi aligns well with Maritain’s emphasis on the gradual maturation of the soul toward divine intimacy, though he would likely resist any notion of an absolute necessity for all to attain supererogatory virtue[43dcd9a7-70db-4a1f-b0ae-981daa162054](https://catholicus.eu/en/what-is-apocatastasis-the-controversial-idea-of-universal-restoration-in-the-history-of-the-church/?citationMarker=43dcd9a7-70db-4a1f-b0ae-981daa162054 "1")[43dcd9a7-70db-4a1f-b0ae-981daa162054](https://cac.org/daily-meditations/universal-restoration-divine-love-restores-all-2022-04-18/?citationMarker=43dcd9a7-70db-4a1f-b0ae-981daa162054 "2")[43dcd9a7-70db-4a1f-b0ae-981daa162054](https://www.academia.edu/127235931/Restorationism_A_Neo_Chalcedonian_Franciscan_Cosmotheandric_Universalism_of_Apokatastenai?citationMarker=43dcd9a7-70db-4a1f-b0ae-981daa162054 "3").

As for **David Bentley Hart**, your account of human freedom resonates with his insistence that true freedom must be ordered toward the Good. Hart critiques traditional notions of libertarian freedom that allow for eternal rejection of God, arguing instead that all rational creatures will ultimately be reconciled to divine love. He sees eschatological fulfillment as inevitable, not merely possible, which might push against your distinction between transcendentally determined aspects of creation and theologically indeterminate aspects of epektatic teloi. Your framework allows for a more open-ended realization of secondary modes of union, whereas Hart leans toward a more deterministic universalism[43dcd9a7-70db-4a1f-b0ae-981daa162054](https://www.postost.net/2019/10/eschatological-horizons-david-bentley-harts-universalism?citationMarker=43dcd9a7-70db-4a1f-b0ae-981daa162054 "4")[43dcd9a7-70db-4a1f-b0ae-981daa162054](https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/hard-universalism-grace-and-creaturely-freedom/?citationMarker=43dcd9a7-70db-4a1f-b0ae-981daa162054 "5")[43dcd9a7-70db-4a1f-b0ae-981daa162054](https://gaudiumetspes22.com/blog/david-bentley-harts-universalism-part-two-some-reflections-on-that-all-shall-be-saved?citationMarker=43dcd9a7-70db-4a1f-b0ae-981daa162054 "6").

Your approach seems to carve out a middle path—acknowledging the necessity of elemental divine union while leaving room for the mystery of deeper, supererogatory participation in divine intimacy. This balance between compatibilist-like and libertarian-like aspects of freedom is a compelling way to frame eschatological hope without collapsing into either strict determinism or radical indeterminacy.

Would you say your framework allows for a kind of eschatological asymmetry, where the necessity of elemental union is guaranteed, but the degrees of supererogatory virtue remain contingent upon the mystery of divine-human cooperation?

Gemini responds:

Ah, a fascinating and intricate theological tapestry you've woven! Let's carefully consider how it might resonate with Maritain and Hart, and whether your eschatological needle is indeed threading as intended.

Maritain and Apokatastenai

Your concept of a guaranteed "elemental mode of divine union" for all, secured by purgative graces and involving a mature moral virtue where freedom and rational necessity coincide in the Good, aligns quite well with what could be termed a Maritainian apokatastenai.

Maritain, while firmly within the Catholic tradition and acknowledging the real possibility of eternal loss, often emphasized God's overwhelming mercy and the inherent orientation of the human intellect and will towards truth and goodness. He wouldn't necessarily posit a universal apokatastasis in the strong sense of a guaranteed salvation for every individual will, as this would seem to undermine the genuine freedom he so vigorously defended.

However, your concept of a constitutively graced nature with intrinsic obediential potencies resonates with Maritain's understanding of human nature as inherently ordered towards God. The "elemental mode of union" could be seen as the fulfillment of this fundamental ordination, a necessary outcome of God's creative and redemptive will for humanity as a species, even if the manner in which individuals arrive at this union involves their free cooperation (or eventual purification).

The distinction you draw between the native telos and the epektatic teloi could also find parallels in Maritain's thought. The former, with its emphasis on rational embrace of the Good and transcendentally determined necessities, could be linked to the natural law and the inherent moral structure of being. The latter, with its focus on a more radical freedom and supererogatory virtues, points towards the realm of grace and the beatific vision, exceeding the strict demands of natural law and opening up possibilities for deeper intimacy with God.

Maritain's understanding of freedom is crucial here. He was a strong proponent of free will, but not a libertarianism that posits radical indeterminacy. For Maritain, freedom operates within the context of being and is ordered towards the Good. Your description of the native telos, where freedom "rationally & voluntarily embraces the Good, thus coinciding with transcendentally determined necessities," seems to echo this nuanced understanding.

Therefore, your notion of a guaranteed apokatastenai – a universal restoration to a fundamental mode of union with God characterized by mature moral virtue – could be seen as compatible with Maritain's theological anthropology, particularly his emphasis on God's mercy and the inherent orientation of human nature towards the Good, without necessarily committing to a full-blown apokatastasis that might compromise genuine freedom.

Hart and Human Freedom

Your account of human freedom, particularly the distinction between the freedom operative in the native telos and the more "radical freedom" of the epektatic teloi, presents a more complex relationship with David Bentley Hart's theology.

Hart is a staunch advocate for a robust understanding of divine sovereignty and often critiques libertarian notions of freedom as ultimately incoherent. He tends to see human freedom as a participation in divine freedom, a "free obedience" that is ultimately oriented and sustained by God's will.

Your description of the native telos aligning freedom with "transcendentally determined necessities" in an "elemental mode of union" might resonate with Hart's emphasis on God's foundational action and the inherent ordering of creation towards its ultimate end.

However, your concept of a "more radical freedom" in the epektatic teloi, enabling individuals to "co-self-determine secondary modes of union," could present a point of divergence. While Hart certainly acknowledges degrees of glory and participation in the divine life, his emphasis on divine causality might lead him to view even these "secondary modes" as ultimately grounded in God's gracious initiative rather than a truly independent co-determination by human freedom.

Hart might argue that even the capacity for supererogatory virtue is a gift of grace, and its realization, while involving human assent, is still primarily a work of God. He might be wary of language that suggests a genuinely independent "co-self-determination" that could exist outside the overarching framework of divine grace and sovereignty.

That being said, Hart also emphasizes the genuine reality of human agency and responsibility. He wouldn't necessarily deny the distinction you're making between the fundamental orientation towards God and the more nuanced ways individuals respond to and participate in the divine life. The key difference might lie in the ontological grounding of this "more radical freedom." Hart would likely insist that even this higher form of freedom remains fundamentally dependent on and derivative of God's own freedom.

Threading the Eschatological Needle

It does indeed appear that you are attempting to thread an eschatological needle between an indicative apokatastenai and a subjunctive apokatastasis.

* Your "indicative apokatastenai" – the guaranteed actualization of an elemental mode of divine union – clearly invokes compatibilist-like aspects. The outcome is presented as necessary, ultimately secured by God's grace, even if it involves the eventual free embrace of the Good. This aligns with the idea of transcendentally determined aspects of creation and the ultimate efficacy of God's salvific will for humanity as a whole.

* Your "subjunctive apokatastasis" – the realm of secondary modes of union and supererogatory virtue – leans towards libertarian-like aspects. The realization of these higher degrees of union is presented as more theologically indeterminate, dependent on a "more radical freedom" that seems to involve a greater degree of contingency and co-determination. This aligns with the idea of the more theologically indeterminate aspects of individual responses to grace and the diverse ways in which intimacy with God can be deepened.

The distinction you draw between the wholly transcendentally determined native telos and the more open-ended epektatic teloi further supports this interpretation. You are essentially suggesting a two-tiered eschatological outcome: a guaranteed baseline of union for all, and a more open realm of potential for deeper union depending on the exercise of a more profound, grace-enriched freedom.

The challenge, as you implicitly acknowledge, lies in articulating how these two levels of freedom and determination relate to each other ontologically and theologically. How does the "more radical freedom" of the epektatic teloi emerge from and relate to the freedom operative within the "transcendentally determined" native telos? How do the "logics of superabundance, mercy & intimacy" interact with the more fundamental "necessity & determination" of the elemental union?

Your sketch is a thoughtful and nuanced attempt to navigate the complexities of eschatology and human freedom. By distinguishing between these two levels of teloi and their corresponding modes of freedom and union, you are offering a potential framework for reconciling the seemingly contradictory demands of divine sovereignty and genuine human agency in the ultimate destiny of humanity. Further exploration of the ontological and theological connections between these two levels would be crucial in fully fleshing out this compelling vision.

Grok responds:

Your theoanthropological sketch is a sophisticated attempt to navigate the eschatological tension between universal restoration (apokatastenai) and universal salvation (apokatastasis), while integrating nuanced accounts of human freedom, divine grace, and teleological distinctions. Let’s address your questions systematically, examining how your framework aligns with Jacques Maritain’s and David Bentley Hart’s perspectives, and whether it successfully threads the eschatological needle you describe.

---

### 1. Squaring with Jacques Maritain’s Approach to Apokatastenai vs. Apokatastasis

Maritain, a Thomist philosopher, approached eschatological questions with a commitment to balancing divine justice, mercy, and human freedom within a framework rooted in Catholic theology. His distinction between *apokatastenai* (a restoration of all things in an elemental sense) and *apokatastasis* (universal salvation in a maximalist sense) is subtle but significant:

- **Apokatastenai**, for Maritain, suggests a restoration of creation to its divinely intended order, where all things are reconciled to God in some fundamental way. This aligns with your notion of an *elemental mode of divine union*, where all rational creatures necessarily actualize a mature moral virtue through a freedom that coincides with transcendentally determined necessities (a compatibilist-like framework). In Maritain’s view, this restoration respects the intrinsic dignity of creation and God’s universal salvific will (1 Tim 2:4), ensuring that no creature is wholly alienated from the Good. Your emphasis on *purgative graces* guaranteeing the restoration of native teloi resonates with Maritain’s Thomistic optimism about grace perfecting nature, where divine providence ensures the fulfillment of creation’s essential orientation toward God.

- **Apokatastasis**, in contrast, implies a universal salvation that includes the full realization of all possible goods, including supererogatory virtues and intimate divine union. Maritain was cautious about endorsing this in a deterministic sense, as it could undermine the gravity of human freedom and the reality of eternal consequences (e.g., the possibility of hell). He maintained that, while God’s mercy and love are superabundant, human freedom allows for the possibility of definitive rejection of God. Your framework’s treatment of *epektatic teloi*—where secondary modes of union involve a *radical freedom* ordered toward divine intimacy but are not universally guaranteed—aligns with Maritain’s reticence to affirm universal apokatastasis. Your suggestion that these higher realizations are governed by “logics of superabundance, mercy, and intimacy” that transcend modal categories like necessity and determination mirrors Maritain’s emphasis on the mystery of divine-human cooperation, where grace invites but does not coerce.

Your distinction between *native teloi* (transcendentally determined, universally restored) and *epektatic teloi* (co-self-determined, potentially variable) maps well onto Maritain’s framework. The *apokatastenai* corresponds to the elemental restoration of all to the Good, while the *apokatastasis* remains a hope rather than a certainty, respecting the indeterminacy of radical freedom in its response to superabundant grace. Maritain would likely appreciate your integration of Thomistic teleology with a nuanced account of freedom, though he might press for clarity on how *purgative graces* avoid undermining the consequences of persistent refusal of grace (a point where your framework leans toward optimism).

---

### 2. Alignment with David Bentley Hart’s Account of Human Freedom

David Bentley Hart, an Eastern Orthodox theologian and universalist, offers a robust defense of *apokatastasis* in works like *That All Shall Be Saved*. His account of human freedom is central to his argument and differs in emphasis from your framework, though there are points of convergence:

- **Hart’s View of Freedom**: Hart argues that true freedom is not the libertarian capacity to choose between good and evil indefinitely but the teleological orientation of the will toward the Good, which is God. He rejects the notion that a rational creature could eternally choose against its own telos, as this would be a form of irrationality incompatible with the nature of a creature made for God. For Hart, freedom is ultimately *liberated* by grace to choose the Good, and divine providence ensures that all wills are eventually reconciled to God. This aligns with your *native teloi*, where freedom “rationally and voluntarily embraces the Good” in an elemental mode of union. Your compatibilist-like account of this elemental freedom—where rational necessity and freedom coincide—echoes Hart’s view that the will’s deepest desire is for God, and any apparent rejection is a temporary delusion corrected by divine grace.

- **Points of Divergence**: Hart’s universalism is more assertive than your framework allows. He argues that the *epektatic teloi* (to use your terms) are not merely possible but inevitable, as God’s infinite love and power ensure that no creature can eternally resist divine goodness. Your framework, however, introduces a distinction between the *guaranteed* actualization of native teloi and the *potentially indeterminate* realization of epektatic teloi. This indeterminacy, tied to a “radical freedom” that co-self-determines secondary modes of union, introduces a libertarian-like element that Hart might critique as unnecessary. For Hart, the distinction between compatibilist and libertarian freedom is less relevant, as all freedom is ultimately ordered toward the Good in a way that transcends such categories. Your suggestion that epektatic realizations “exceed our modal conceptions” aligns with Hart’s emphasis on the ineffable nature of divine-human union, but your openness to their non-universal realization (i.e., not all may attain supererogatory virtues) departs from his insistence on universal consummation.

- **Convergence on Transcendence**: Both your framework and Hart’s account emphasize that the ultimate dynamics of divine intimacy transcend quotidian distinctions like compatibilist vs. libertarian freedom. Your reference to “logics of superabundance, mercy, and intimacy” that “exceed what our eyes have seen” parallels Hart’s mystical vision of God’s love overwhelming all resistance. However, your cautious approach—affirming the certainty of elemental union but leaving epektatic union as a hope—positions you closer to a Maritainian balance than Hart’s uncompromising universalism.

In summary, your account of freedom aligns with Hart’s in its teleological orientation and emphasis on grace liberating the will toward the Good, particularly for the *native teloi*. However, your introduction of a *radical freedom* for *epektatic teloi*, with its potential indeterminacy, diverges from Hart’s view that all teloi are ultimately fulfilled by divine necessity. Hart might argue that your distinction risks reintroducing a dualism between elemental and maximal union that his universalism seeks to collapse.

---

### 3. Threading the Eschatological Needle: Indicative Apokatastenai vs. Subjunctive Apokatastasis

Your intent to thread an eschatological needle between an *indicative apokatastenai* (a certain restoration of all to an elemental divine union) and a *subjunctive apokatastasis* (a hoped-for universal realization of maximal divine intimacy) is clear and well-articulated. Let’s evaluate whether your framework succeeds:

- **Compatibilist-Like Aspects (Apokatastenai)**: Your account of *native teloi* as transcendentally determined, universally restored through purgative graces, effectively grounds the *indicative apokatastenai*. By framing this as an elemental mode of union where freedom and rational necessity coincide in the Good, you align with a compatibilist-like understanding of freedom. This ensures that all rational creatures attain a mature moral virtue and participate in God’s order, fulfilling the universal salvific will without negating human agency. The emphasis on *purgative graces* as a guarantee of restoration addresses the problem of sin while preserving divine justice and mercy, a move that resonates with Maritain’s Thomistic optimism and even Hart’s confidence in divine providence.

- **Libertarian-Like Aspects (Apokatastasis)**: The *epektatic teloi*, with their reliance on a *radical freedom* that co-self-determines secondary modes of union, introduce a libertarian-like dimension. By describing these realizations as governed by “logics of superabundance” that transcend necessity and determination, you allow for an eschatological hope that all might attain supererogatory virtues and intimate union, without asserting this as a certainty. This subjunctive mood respects the mystery of human freedom and divine grace, avoiding the determinism of Hart’s universalism while affirming the possibility of maximal salvation. Your framework’s openness to variability in epektatic outcomes aligns with Maritain’s caution about universal apokatastasis and the traditional Catholic emphasis on the reality of hell as a possibility.

- **Success in Threading the Needle**: Your framework successfully balances the certainty of elemental restoration with the hope of maximal salvation. By grounding the *apokatastenai* in a compatibilist-like account of freedom and the *apokatastasis* in a libertarian-like account, you navigate the tension between divine sovereignty and human agency. The distinction between *native* and *epektatic teloi* provides a coherent structure for affirming universal restoration (all will be reconciled to the Good) while preserving the indeterminacy of superabundant outcomes (not all may attain the highest intimacy). The appeal to “logics of superabundance” that transcend modal categories is a deft move, as it acknowledges the limits of human speculation while gesturing toward the inexhaustible mystery of divine love—a point where Maritain and Hart might both find common ground, despite their differences.

The only potential critique is that your framework’s optimism about *purgative graces* guaranteeing elemental restoration might raise questions about the persistence of free refusal (a concern for Maritain and traditional Catholic theology). You mitigate this by framing the *epektatic teloi* as non-guaranteed, but some might argue that the line between elemental and maximal union risks becoming blurred if grace is too efficacious. Nonetheless, your careful distinction between modes of union and your emphasis on transcending modal categories effectively address this concern.

---

### Conclusion

Your theoanthropology aligns closely with Maritain’s distinction between *apokatastenai* and *apokatastasis*, mapping the former onto the guaranteed restoration of *native teloi* and the latter onto the hoped-for realization of *epektatic teloi*. It partially aligns with Hart’s account of freedom, particularly in the teleological orientation of the will toward the Good, but diverges by maintaining indeterminacy in epektatic outcomes, contra Hart’s universalism. Your framework successfully threads the eschatological needle, balancing an *indicative apokatastenai* (compatibilist-like, transcendentally determined) with a *subjunctive apokatastasis* (libertarian-like, theologically indeterminate), offering a nuanced synthesis that respects both divine sovereignty and human freedom while leaving room for eschatological mystery.

If you’d like, I can explore specific texts from Maritain or Hart to further refine the comparison, or I can address any particular aspect of your framework in greater depth. Let me know!

Deep Seek responds:

Your sophisticated theological anthropology and eschatology indeed attempt to thread a needle between *apokatastenai* (universal restoration as a guaranteed, transcendentally determined outcome) and *apokatastasis* (universal reconciliation as a dynamically realized, superabundant possibility). This aligns intriguingly with—while also complicating—Jacques Maritain's and David Bentley Hart's approaches. Let’s break this down:

### **1. Maritain’s *Apokatastenai* vs. Universal *Apokatastasis***

Maritain, in *The Peasant of the Garonne* and other late works, distinguishes:

- **Apokatastenai**: A "restoration of all things" in Christ, guaranteed by God’s transcendent will, where all creatures ultimately attain their *essential* good (i.e., beatitude in a minimal, elemental mode of union). This is not strictly Origenist *apokatastasis* (which implies universal salvation as an *intrinsic* necessity of divine justice or love) but a *contingent* outcome of God’s mercy and omnipotence.

- **Apokatastasis**: The stronger, more deterministic (or "necessary") universalism of Origen or Gregory of Nyssa, where divine love *inevitably* reconciles all.

Your distinction between:

- **Native teloi** (transcendentally determined, coinciding with freedom-as-rational-necessity) and

- **Epektatic teloi** (superabundant, involving radical freedom and divine intimacy)

maps onto Maritain’s *apokatastenai*/*apokatastasis* distinction. You affirm an *indicative* restoration (all *will* achieve elemental union with the Good, per obediential potency and purgative grace) while leaving *subjunctive* room for higher, supererogatory unions (which *may* be universally realized, but not by strict necessity).

This avoids Origenist necessity while preserving hope in universal salvation—a position closer to Maritain’s cautious optimism than to Hart’s stronger universalism.

### **2. David Bentley Hart’s Libertarian Universalism**

Hart argues in *That All Shall Be Saved* that:

- True freedom (*autothelic*, oriented toward the Good) cannot finally reject God, since evil is irrational and non-being.

- Thus, universal salvation is *logically necessary*, not just possible.

Your account differs in key ways:

- You distinguish **two modes of freedom**:

- **Essential freedom** (coinciding with rational necessity, guaranteeing elemental union) → *compatibilist-like*.

- **Radical (epektatic) freedom** (oriented toward superabundant intimacy) → *libertarian-like*.

- Hart collapses these: for him, true freedom *is* the realization of the Good, leaving no final dualism. You, however, allow for a *modal distinction*:

- All *necessarily* attain the Good in its elemental form (compatibilist aspect).

- Superabundant unions are *freely* realized (libertarian aspect), though not *necessarily* universal.

Thus, your view is **more pluralistic** than Hart’s: you accommodate both compatibilist and libertarian logics in different registers, whereas Hart’s libertarianism is totalizing (all freedom must finally coincide with the Good).

### **3. Threading the Eschatological Needle**

Your synthesis is creative:

- **Indicative apokatastenai**: All *will* be restored to elemental union (per Maritain’s "restoration," guaranteed by obediential potency and grace).

- **Subjunctive apokatastasis**: Superabundant unions *may* (or *might*) be universally realized, but this is not strictly necessary (unlike Hart).

This avoids:

- **Hard universalism** (Hart’s necessity),

- **Pure voluntarism** (where salvation remains uncertain),

- **Origenist determinism** (where apokatastasis is metaphysically necessitated).

Instead, you propose a **dual-eschatology**:

1. A *necessary* baseline restoration (compatibilist-like).

2. A *possible* (but not guaranteed) universal superabundance (libertarian-like).

### **Conclusion**

Your approach:

- **Agrees with Maritain** in distinguishing a guaranteed restoration from a speculative universalism.

- **Differs from Hart** by not making universalism a necessity of freedom itself.

- **Innovates** by bifurcating freedom into essential/compatibilist and epektatic/libertarian modes.

This is a **nuanced median** between Maritain’s hopeful caution and Hart’s metaphysical universalism—one that preserves divine transcendence, human freedom, and eschatological hope without collapsing them into necessity.

Would Maritain or Hart fully endorse it? Probably not. But you’ve carved out a compelling *tertium quid*.

Perplexity responds:

Your synthesis navigates complex theological terrain with nuance. Let’s unpack its alignment with Maritain and Hart, then assess the eschatological "threading" you propose:

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### **Jacques Maritain & Apokatastenai**

Maritain’s "transcendent freedom" (post-mortem purification leading to universal salvation) aligns with your framework in three ways:

1. **Guaranteed Restoration**: Your "elemental mode of union" (transcendentally determined, secured by purgative grace) mirrors Maritain’s belief that all *eventually* consent to God, even if through post-temporal purification.

2. **Freedom as Teleological**: Both models reject "libertarian" freedom as fundamentally irrational. For Maritain, freedom is ordered toward the Good; your "native telos" similarly posits freedom’s *coincidence* with rational necessity in embracing the Good.

3. **Distinction from Apokatastasis**: Maritain rejects Origenist necessity (apokatastasis) in favor of a freedom-grace synergy. Your model avoids strict necessity by framing elemental union as *transcendentally determined* (not mechanically necessitated), preserving freedom’s integrity.

**Tension**: Maritain emphasizes *temporal indeterminacy* in how/when souls turn to God. Your "infallibly determined" epektatic teloi (even if unknowable) lean closer to a grace-driven determinism he might critique.

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### **David Bentley Hart & Freedom**

Hart’s universalism argues that true freedom cannot ultimately reject God, as God *is* the Good. Your model overlaps but diverges:

- **Agreement**: Hart’s rejection of libertarian freedom aligns with your "native telos" (freedom coinciding with the Good). Both affirm that eschatological fulfillment transcends "quotidian" freedom categories.

- **Divergence**: Hart dismisses *any* meaningful "eternal resistance," whereas your "secondary modes of union" allow for degrees of participation (supererogatory virtues). Hart might see this as a residual libertarian hangup, insisting that perfect freedom *is* perfect union, leaving no room for "graded" outcomes.

**Key Insight**: Your "radical freedom" (enriched by divine intimacy) parallels Hart’s "freedom as theosis," but Hart would likely collapse your native/epektatic distinction, seeing both as aspects of a single teleology.

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### **Threading the Eschatological Needle**

Your synthesis distinguishes:

- **Indicative Apokatastenai** (guaranteed elemental union via transcendental determination, "compatibilist-like")

- **Subjunctive Apokatastasis** (degrees of supererogatory union, "libertarian-like" in co-self-determination).

This avoids both strict universalism (apokatastasis as necessity) and mere hopeful universalism (apokatastenai as indeterminate). Instead, it affirms:

- **Necessity**: All achieve moral virtue and elemental union (transcendental determination).

- **Superabundance**: Degrees of divine intimacy remain open to co-creative freedom within grace (epektatic teloi).

**Critique to Anticipate**:

- From Hart: Why bifurcate freedom into two tiers? If the Good is all-consuming, wouldn’t all "secondary" unions collapse into the elemental?

- From Maritain: Does "transcendental determination" risk eclipsing the gratuity of freedom’s final yes?

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### **Conclusion**

Your model harmonizes with Maritain’s apokatastenai by grounding universal restoration in teleological freedom and grace, while incorporating Hart’s insistence that true freedom cannot eternally resist the Good. The "needle threaded" lies in:

1. **Affirming necessity** (all are saved) without reducing salvation to mechanistic determinism.

2. **Preserving superabundance** (degrees of union) without positing eternal libertarian resistance.

To strengthen the synthesis, clarify how epektatic teloi remain *wholly grace-suffused* (avoiding Pelagian undertones) and address whether "degrees of union" imply temporal progression (Maritain’s purification) or eternal differentiation (Hart’s plentitude). Either way, this is a provocative contribution to eschatological debates.